To: Lorna Murphy, Director of Buses, TfL

From: Kevin Mustafa

RE: Why do the Mayor and TfL refuse to protect London's Bus Drivers from Institutionally Unsafe Working Conditions?

Sent: Thursday, February 19, 2026 1:20 PM

cc: Transport Commissioner; Deputy Mayor for Transport; Deputy Mayor for Social Justice and Communities, London Victims' Commissioner; TfL Walking and Cycling Commissioner; TfL Board Secretariat; TfL SSHR Panel Secretariat; TfL Chief Safety Officer; TfL Director of Bus; TfL Head of Insights and Direction; TfL Chief Operations Officer; London Assembly Transport Committee Members; CEO, London TravelWatch; Dan Tomlinson MP; Ben Coleman MP; Katie Lam MP; Olly Glover MP; Ruth Cadbury MP; Catherine Atkinson MP;  Workplace Colleague Network - London Bus Forums; Sharon Graham - Unite the Union; Journalists; Bus Drivers; Campaigners

Dear Ms Murphy,

Thank you for your perfunctory response. Kindly note that I have recirculated it to everyone who was copied on my original email, as I have also  done with my response today.

As you probably know from my earlier letters to City Hall and TfL (cf. Speaking out against London Buses' Culture of Fear, 19 August 2021), my decision to quit the buses and campaign for the Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights was inspired by the fact that, six years ago today, Bus Drivers were being abandoned by their Bus Operator employers, Unite the Union, TfL and the Mayor when they started getting sick and dying from Covid-19.  Your response confirms that, despite at least 76 Bus Drivers dying from Covid-19, nothing has changed. 

·       TfL has yet to conduct "a short-term review of shift lengths, patterns and rotas of London bus drivers" recommended by the UCL Institute of Health Equity in March 2021 and agreed by TfL to complete "by summer 2021";

·       One in Four London Bus Routes still lack Toilet Facilities at one end for Bus Drivers;

·       Compared to 2024, in 2025 the number of Bus Drivers taken to hospital from Assault/Vandalism incidents increased by 17%. 

Since (a) the Mayor has sole responsibility for Policing in London and (b) the unanimous London Assembly Motion called for the Mayor and TfL—

 "to issue a public apology to Mr Hehir and to apply pressure to Metroline to reinstate Mr Hehir or provide appropriate compensation for his dismissal"

—I think you'll find your complacent restatement of TfL's long-standing policy of ignoring Bus Driver welfare is deeply out-of-sync with both the Mayor's legal obligations and the public mood. 

According to TfL's own data, over the period 1 January 2014-31 December 2025, an average of 7 Bus Drivers per month were reported by TfL as having been injured in Assault/Vandalism incidents on London's buses, of which over one driver per month was taken to hospital. 

Since I know that many Bus Drivers don't report injuries they receive on duty, I believe TfL's numbers are underestimates. 

Over the same 11-year period, an average of 15 people per month were reported injured from an Assault/Vandalism incident on buses and about 4 per month were taken to hospital.  

I'd wager TfL's numbers of passenger injuries from Assault/Vandalism incidents are also underestimates. 

TfL's data also reveal that Bus Drivers accounted for 41% of all reported injuries from Assault/Vandalism incidents and 46% of all those taken to hospital.

As you no doubt know, over the period for which TfL has made bus safety data available for public scrutiny, Bus Drivers—on average—have only constituted an infinitesimal (0.0011%!) of the total number of annual Bus Passengers.  Hence, I think you'll agree with me that the fact that Bus Drivers are 80,000 times more likely than a passenger to be injured and 40,000 times more likely than a passenger to be taken to the hospital in an Assault/Vandalism incident on London's buses demands that TfL do more than just abdicate responsibility for Bus Drivers' safety and security. 

TfL's numbers reveal an obvious fact: Bus Drivers are not just casual victims of Assault/Vandalism incidents on London's buses, they are the primary victims of this increasing violence.

Given this well-evidenced risk, when a Bus Driver chooses to intervene to defend a Bus Passenger against Assault/Vandalism and is subsequently dismissed for gross misconduct—and the Mayor, TfL and Unite the Union do nothing—the outcome of this complacency undermines the safety of London's Bus Network for which the Mayor and TfL are legally accountable. 

And TfL's decision to side with Metroline against Mark Hehir—i.e., against someone who TfL's own data shows had the highest risk of serious injury and the most to lose from intervening in an Assault/Vandalism incident—simply re-broadcasts a clear message, that I've been familiar with— 

(a) since Bus Drivers started to sicken and die around me from Covid-19 6 years ago this month, and;

(b) each time the Mayor fails to respond to Bus Drivers' reasonable demand to incorporate the Bus Drivers Bill of Rights into TfL's Framework Bus Services Agreement:

—TfL takes no responsibility for the security and safety of London's Bus Drivers. 

Since we already know that TfL's  "incident reporting system does not specifically collect data relating to disciplinary outcomes" regarding Bus Drivers, your statement that it "would not be appropriate for TfL to intervene" rings hollow: the public record shows that TfL completely washes its hands of how Bus Drivers are disciplined by their employers.

The London Assembly Motion also calls on the Mayor and TfL—

"to set out clear guidance for transport workers protecting passengers."

I do hope the London Assembly Members copied here will take note of the clear guidance your response conveyed: 

TfL will support any Bus Operator which fires a Bus Driver who chooses to risk injury to protect Bus Passengers against Assault/Vandalism incidents on London's buses.

Why do the Mayor and TfL refuse to protect London's Bus Drivers?

Yours sincerely,

Kevin Mustafa

London Bus Safety Campaigner

Founding Member - Bus Driver Bill of Rights Campaign

-----------------ATTACHMENT------------------

From: Bus Ops FOIs & Inquiries <BusOpsFOIsInquir@tfl.gov.uk>

Sent: Friday, February 13, 2026 1:13:07 PM

To: Kevin Mustafa

Subject: RE: Subject Intervention Requested: Dismissal of Bus Driver Mark Hehir

Dear Kevin,

Please see below a response to your email from Lorna Murphy.

Dear Kevin,

Thank you for your email. As you are aware, bus services in London are delivered by private operators, such as Metroline, under contract to TfL. Operational matters, including staffing and employment decisions within individual companies, sit with those operators. As this issue relates to Metroline's internal employment processes, it would not be appropriate for TfL to intervene. You may wish to raise your concerns directly with Metroline so they can address them through their established procedures.

Yours sincerely,

Lorna Murphy 

By email and blogpost

Any transparency shown by TfL about the frequent deaths and serious injuries generated by its contracted bus fleet is the direct result of a policy forced upon London's Local Transport Authority (LTA) by Mayor Boris Johnson in 2014. TfL's reluctant transparency came about only after it been regularly receiving (a) bad press generated by my 'relentless' volunteer research and campaigning and (b) public scrutiny from London Assembly members, namely Victoria Borwick, and Richard Tracey (Conservative), Caroline Pidgeon (Liberal Democrat), Jenny Jones and Darren Johnson (Green).  

Analysis of the Bus Safety Performance Data (called—interchangeably—"IRIS" or "SHE" Data) that TfL has published every quarter since 2014 evidences—

• there have been, on average, over 26,000 recorded TfL bus crashes per year—that's an average of at least 72 potentially-lethal bus crashes per day—with 2024 witnessing the highest number of recorded crashes (nearly 29,000 or 79 per day) since 2014 (nearly 25,000 or 68 per day).
• at least 10,818 people have been injured in a collision involving a TfL Bus, of which 3557 victims have been 'taken to hospital'.  In his responses to many Mayor's Questions, the Mayor has repeatedly confirmed that TfL has no idea if these victims who have been compelled to be taken to hospital from injuries sustained "in or by a bus" have recovered fully or suffer from life-changing injuries or have passed away.  Accordingly, the veracity of any serious injury figure published by TfL involving its contracted bus fleet is, quite frankly, dubious; 
• at least 137 people have been killed in preventable Bus Safety Incidents in London—113 from collisions, 16 from onboard falls and 9 from other safety-related incidents (e.g, deaths from ill-defined but safety-related 'activity', 'near misses', personal injuries').
• about 10 percent of all vehicle-related pedestrian fatalities in London have resulted from a collision involving a TfL Bus — in 2024, that horrifically large percentage increased to 15%.

(a) now only accounts for about 1 percent of all vehicles on London's roads at any time (down from about 3 percent in 2014), and;

(b) these vehicles' presence on London's roads and ridership have steadily declined since 2014;  

"for no one to be killed in or by a London bus by 2030"

Since TfL's official annual bus fatality totals and the 2010-14 baseline are frequently cited by the Mayor and TfL in official reports and press releases—and, as a direct consequence—in Government and media reports—you might appreciate my firmly held conviction that each time the Mayor or TfL quote numbers and baselines that purport to reflect everyone "killed in or by a bus" in London, those numbers should be based on fact.  

3. Keith Prince AM's scrutiny of TfL's 2010-2024 Bus Fatality Data 

In October 2025 (and confirmed by the Mayor in his response to Question 2025/3723), Keith Prince requested TfL to provide him with the raw 2010-14 bus fatal incident data that it used to populate the information published in, inter alia, TfL's "Fatalities in Greater London 2024" Report. Despite the fact that Keith Prince later requested the Mayor to compel TfL to publish this raw data on the London Assembly website for public scrutiny, the Mayor failed to honour Keith Prince's request.  However, I am grateful Keith Prince shared both TfL's 21 November 2024 cover email and its attached data directly with me. 

Based on my analysis of the information TfL provided to Keith Prince directly for scrutiny, below please find my findings that I hope will encourage further actions by Brake Charity.

4. TfL's 2010-14 Baseline cannot be accurate

Below please find the 21 November 2025 correspondence from TfL to Keith Prince AM. 

From: Members Correspondence <MembersCorrespondence@tfl.gov.uk> 

Sent: Friday, November 21, 2025 4:21:11 PM

To: Keith Prince <Keith.Prince@london.gov.uk>

Subject: Follow up from bus safety discussion

Dear Keith,

Thank you for meeting with us last month to discuss our bus safety data. We hope that you found this helpful and productive.

As requested, we have compiled a spreadsheet showing the bus fatalities that are included in table 3 of the data annex (Bus-involved fatalities), we have included the date, borough, collision location and causality mode of travel. Please note, this only includes police-reported (STATS19 fatalities) and doesn't include non-STATS19 fatalities such as medical incidents and fatalities resulting from collisions on private land.

Unfortunately, the raw data which we have used in the spreadsheet is only available from 2017 onwards.  This is because bus casualty data is part of a 'Bus or Coach' category as per the Department for Transport STATS19 modal categories. In 2017 TfL agreed with the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) to split out bus and coaches to enable better monitoring of incidents relating to our buses, this means that from 2017 a flag was included for London buses in the police form which could be used to identify bus-involved fatalities. Prior to 2017, bus involved figures are estimates based on modelled data, so raw data records are not available to share.

Some of the other requested information, such as the bus route and operator, is not recorded in STATS19 and as such could not be included in the attached. 

Please let us know if you have any further questions. 

Kind regards,

[NAME WITHHELD]

Government Relations

11th Floor, Palestra, SE1 8NJ

Despite the Mayor repeatedly stating (cf. Question 2025/4415 from December 2025) that TfL uses a 2010-14 Baseline to, inter alia—

• measure TfL's 'progress' against Vision Zero Bus Safety targets and
• determine levels of annual performance bonuses paid to TfL executives

—this email confirms that TfL has no reliable raw bus fatality data that underwrites this key Vision Zero and Bus Safety Performance baseline. Furthermore, the fact that TfL admits that it's using STATS19 Data to represent the number of people "killed in or by a bus" each year proves that TfL knows it is citing a mere subset of a larger group of fatalities.  If you review the Bus Safety Data Guidance that TfL issued hastily and without explanation in early November 2024, STATS19 criteria allows TfL to exclude victims—

 "killed in or by a bus" from "collisions on private land, noncollisions (e.g. death due to medical episodes or slips, trips and falls on a bus), incidents outside the Greater London boundary and death occurring after 30 days."  

While those exclusions might produce inaccurate bus fatality datasets acceptable to the DfT (cf. RAS0601, which shows 521 fatal road collision incidents involving a "Bus or Coach" from 2015-2024), TfL's use of knowingly smaller STATS19 datasets to reflect the total number of people "killed in or by bus" for each year to "measure progress towards the Mayor's Transport Strategy bus involved fatality target for 2030", is frankly, simply intentionally misleading. As you know, both the Mayor's Transport Strategy and the 2030 target are unique-to-London and there is no statutory, legal or moral requirement for TfL to publish less-robust STATS19-defined figures for these reports that relate exclusively to TfL's 'progress towards the Mayor's Transport Strategy bus involved fatality target for 2030.'

5. TfL is intentionally excluding documented incidents of people "killed in or by a bus" in its official reports that claim to show the total number of people "killed in or by a bus".

My reconciliation of the raw 2017-2024 data TfL emailed to Keith Prince on 21 November 2025 with the IRIS Data TfL has published on its website quarterly since 2014 reveals that, since 2017, TfL has failed to report 21 documented incidents of "people killed in or by a bus". This means that, for the past 7 years (at least), TfL has failed to acknowledge the deaths of at least 1 in 4 of the total number of people that have actually been "killed in or by a bus". 

In 2017, TfL states that 8 "people were killed in or by a bus", but TfL excluded the following 4 fatal incidents:

• the 11 March 2017 death of an elderly male pedestrian who was killed in a collision involving a Route E6 Bus operated by Metroline (Greenford Depot) under contract to TfL in Hillingdon Borough;
• the 28 April 2017 death of an adult male passenger who was killed after an assault on a Route 189 bus operated by Metroline (Cricklewood Depot) under contract to TfL in Westminster Borough;
• the 29 June 2017 death of an elderly male pedestrian who was killed in a collision involving a Route 216 bus operated by RATP (Fulwell Dept) under contract to TfL in Surrey County;
• the 16 December 2017 death of an adult male passenger who was killed after falling on a Route R11 bus operated by Go Ahead (Orpington Depot) under contract to TfL in Bromley Borough.

• the 1 April 2018 death of a third party driver of unknown sex and age who was killed in a collision involving a Route 61 bus operated by Stagecoach (Bromley Depot) under contract to TfL in Bromley Borough;
• the 23 July 2018 death of an elderly female passenger who was killed in an "activity incident" on a Route W8 bus operated by Metroline (Potters Bar) under contract to TfL in Enfield Borough;
• the 17 September 2018 death of a passenger of unknown sex and age in an "activity incident" on a Route 318 bus operated by Arriva (Enfield Depot) under contract to TfL in Haringey Borough;
• the 6 November 2018 death of an adult male passenger after falling on a Route 32 bus operated by Metroline (Edgware Depot) in Brent Borough. 

• the 12 February 2020 death of an adult male pedestrian in a collision involving a speeding Route 191 bus operated by Go Ahead (Northumberland Park Depot) under contract to TfL 'near' Edmonton Bus Station in Enfield Borough;
• the 14 March 2020 death of an adult male pedestrian in a collision involving a Route 96 bus operated by Stagecoach (Plumstead Depot) in Dartford; 
• the 16 March 2020 death of an elderly male passenger after falling on a Route 106 bus operated by Arriva (Ash Grove Depot) in Haringey;
• the 4 June 2020 death of a third party driver/occupant in a collision with a Route 209 bus operated by Transport UK (Twickenham Depot) in Richmond Upon Thames Borough. 
• the 22 October 2020 death of an elderly female passenger who was killed after falling on a Route 35 bus operated by Go Ahead (Camberwell Depot) in Southwark.

• the 10 August 2021 death of an adult female pedestrian named Melissa Burr who was killed in a collision with a Route 507 bus operated by Go Ahead (Waterloo Depot) at Victoria Bus Station in Westminster Borough. The Evening Standard reported that the Mayor had issued a 'sincere apology' to Melissa Burr's family because TfL "wrongly suggested [she] may have been at fault for her death", an apology the Mayor confirmed in his response to Question 2024/3450. In my view, with all the information about the systemic causes of Victoria Station deaths now in the public domain, TfL's decision to exclude Melissa's Burr's death from the 2021 dataset demands further scrutiny.

• the 18 December 2022 death of an adult male pedestrian named Stephen Mitchell who died after he was critically injured in a collision with a Route 363 bus operated by Go Ahead (Peckham Depot) in Southwark on 26 November 2022.  Similar to Melissa Burr's death, the fact that there is so much in the public domain about the ghastly circumstances surrounding Mr. Mitchell's death, and the fact that the Bus Driver was found guilty  calls into question TfL's decision to exclude his death from the 2022 datasets and demands further scrutiny. 

In 2023, TfL states that 6 "people were killed in or by a bus", but TfL excluded the following 2 fatal incidents: 

• the 12 March 2023 death of an adult male passenger after a collision involving a Route 79 bus operated by RATP (Edgware) in Harrow;
• the 15 December 2023 death of an elderly female pedestrian named Grace Mecaley who was killed in a collision involving a Route 212 bus operated by Go Ahead (Northumberland Depot) under contract to TfL at Walthamstow Bus Station in Waltham Forest Borough. Since TfL had a Notice of Contravention served to it by the Health and Safety Executive as a direct result of this incident—a document, by the way, that both the Mayor and TfL have both yet to provide for public scrutiny—similar to the exclusion of Melissa Burr and Stephen Mitchell from TfL's official fatality data for 2020 and 2022, TfL's justification for excluding Grace Mecaley's death from 2023's official fatality data demands a cogent explanation. 

In 2024, TfL states that 13 "people were killed in or by a bus", but TfL excluded the following 4 incidents:

• the 27 January 2024 death of an elderly female passenger after an "activity incident event" while on a Route 55 bus operated by Stagecoach (Leyton Depot) in Westminster;
• the 11 February 2024 death an adult male pedestrian after a collision involving a Route 158 bus operated by Arriva (Edmonton Depot) in Enfield;
• the 20 June 2024 death of a Bus Occupant of unknown sex and unknown age—an incident that is published in TfL's "Road Fatalities in Greater London since 2019" spreadsheet, but does not appear anywhere else on the TfL site;
• the 30 December 2024 death of an elderly male passenger who died after falling on a Route 5 bus operated by Go Ahead (River Road Depot) in Newham on 15 March 2024. 

Since we already know that (a) at least 1 in 4 bus victims have been ignored in TfL's 2017-2024 official dataset and (b) TfL refuses to provide the raw data to support the data it cites for "people killed in or by a bus" for the period 2010-2016, I reckon that 21 unacknowledged bus deaths is already a serious underestimate of the total number of victims that TfL has chosen to ignore over the period 2010-2024.  In fact, if you've had the opportunity to read my unacknowledged 2 December 2025 Letter to Mayor Sadiq Kahn (#VisionZero: Why is TfL allowed to ghost people who've been killed or seriously injured "on or by a bus" in its annual official Road Casualty reporting?), you'll immediately recognise the names of 2 vanished bus victims from 2010-16. 

• Saba Mirza (31), who was critically injured on a Zebra Crossing in a collision involving a Route 46 bus operated by Metroline under contract to TfL on 25 November 2016, but, I understand from her family, died while still in hospital in early January 2021. How many more vanished victims like Saba Mirza are there? 
• Ezarhul Islam (73), who fell and suffered critical injuries after, judging from the Coroner's 16 June 2016 Regulation 28 Report, a Go Ahead 191 Bus moved suddenly without warning on 23 October 2015, but died while still in hospital in December 2015. In its IRIS Data, TfL recorded the cause of his death as "Medical" and didn't include the incident in its "killed in or by a bus" total for 2015.  Since 1 January 2014, TfL has recorded 69 Bus-related Fatalities with "Medical" identified as the causal factor for death. How many of these "Medical" deaths actually represent vanished bus victims like Mr. Islam?  Based on last month's response to Question 2026/0028, the public will never know because the Mayor has refused to instruct TfL to investigate. 

6. How Brake Charity can Help TfL's and the UK's Vanished Bus Victims

From my quick reconciliation of the raw 2017-2024 Bus Fatality data Keith Prince received from TfL on 21 November 2025 with (a) the documented incidents of people "killed in or by a bus" found in TfL's published  Bus Safety ("SHE/IRIS") Data and Road Safety (STATS19 ) Data  and (b) some AI-assisted Web searching, it would appear that, since 2010, there are at least 23 people whose deaths "in or by a bus" were in vain because—

• Key Vision Zero Safety Target Baselines were created;
• Executive Bonuses were determined and paid;
• Official narratives about "Progress" on Vision Zero appeared in Press Releases that were dutifully reported by the local and national press;
• Evidence was submitted by TfL to at least three London Assembly Bus Safety Investigations and also, to the Department for Transport;

—and these specific documented preventable deaths "in or by a bus" were not acknowledged by TfL to have taken place at all. 

While TfL press spokespeople callously dismiss these ignored vanquished lives as "a small number of other fatalities" and TfL Board Documents negligently classify all bus deaths as "small numbers of low probability events", as the CEO of the leading national charity providing support to Road Victims, can I assume that you will not dismiss TfL having ignored at least 23 victims "killed in or by a bus" since 2010 in its benchmark road safety publications as merely the data geek pedantry of a highly-motivated Bus Crash Survivor but rather treat it as the breach of public trust by the Mayor and TfL that I think it clearly represents?  I might add, for governance of the Mayor's Vision Zero Programme and also for these victims' families, I think the Mayor's and TfL's acknowledgement of these 23 victims "killed in or by a bus" is precisely the point of Vision Zero. 

Accordingly, for a public bus fleet that is entirely within TfL's control, but—

• still ranks poorly for safety performance among its 'world city' peers, and;
• is probably the least safe of any major European city.

• Campaign for the Mayor and TfL to understand that the first step toward supporting those 'impacted' by the frequent deaths and injuries generated by London's contracted public bus operation will be for both to acknowledge that these fatal incidents have occurred at all and have them appear in TfL's Annual Road Casualty publications, Monthly Board papers and the baselines TfL uses to measure 'progress' against for Vision Zero 'bus-involved fatalities and determine annual bonus payments for its executives.  It is not acceptable that the Mayor and TfL have been allowed to claim credit for 'progress'—and TfL's executives have been receiving larger bonus payments—for meeting Vision Zero targets that are not based on the actual number—or published Vision Zero Target—of people "killed in or a by a bus".
• Meet with the Bus Drivers who are leading the Bus Driver Bill of Rights Campaign. I ask, because I know that TfL's secretive Vision Zero Reference Group of which Brake Charity is a member, has representatives from political lobbying groups from the Bus, Taxi and Car industries, but lacks any members who can speak with authority about the well-evidenced "institutionally unsafe" conditions that TfL Bus Contracts inflict on London's Bus Drivers.  And given your recent public comments about the Government's new Road Safety Strategy, I urge to you also to 'be brave' and instruct your charity to begin to understand and campaign to change the systemic safety problems that have plagued TfL's contracted surface transport operation for decades that undermine the ability of a Bus Driver to operate with duty of care for passengers and other road users.
• Read the Evidence Submissions from London and UK Bus Drivers to the Bus Services [No. 2] Bill.  If you are not familiar with Bus Drivers' key systemic safety concerns, these well-evidenced submissions are a good place to start.  I'll make it easy for you—

• https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/61844/documents/6811
• https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/61680/documents/6750
• https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/61691/documents/6758
• https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/61678/documents/6749
• https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/61683/documents/6752
• https://bills.parliament.uk/publications/61937/documents/6837

• Watch the videos produced by Bus Drivers posted on the new @BetterBuses YouTube Channel. For more information about his new grassroots driver-led initiative, please read my unacknowledged 16 January 2026 Open Letter to Elly Baker (Labour), Chair of the London Assembly Transport Committee. 
• Campaign for the DfT to revise its STATS19 bus fatality data definitions to conform to London's Vision Zero "killed in or by a bus" metric, a more robust metric that actually reflects the "Safe Systems" approach upon which the Government claims its recently-published Road Safety Strategy is based.  Based on what we've recently discovered in London, we know that DfT's data showing 521 fatalities from a "Bus or a Coach" for the period 2015-2024 has to be a smaller number than the actual number of road safety-related fatalities that have been generated from the country's bus and coach operations over that period.  Because Lord Hampton raised the issue of the defects of STATS19 reporting for Bus Fatalities in the House of Lords on 13 February 2025, Lord Hendy's response on that date—"in respect of accidents away from public roads, which I will go away and have a close look at. I am not familiar with that nuance, but it is clearly important" —confirms that the Minister knows about STATS19's definitional defects and suggests that the Government's primary road safety dataset for Bus and Coach Fatalities is neither robust nor accurate. I hope Brake Charity can convince Lord Peter Hendy to do more than just "look at" the manifestly obvious and easily solvable problems surrounding STATS19 definitions that have resulted in many of the UK's bus victims to be excluded from the statistics upon which laws and policies are determined.

(a) evidence how—in contrast to other safer transport sectors—TfL does not place a high priority on Human Factors in how public services are contracted, managed and controlled in London, and;(b) offer evidenced-based suggestions as to how TfL's known ignorance of Human Factors that negatively impact Bus Driver Working Conditions can be mitigated. 

Episode 1: Human Factors and the Future of Bus Safety — "If a system allows you to make an error it is a bad system.  If a system induces you to make an error, it is a really bad system."
Episode 2: Londons' iBus Radio System: Fit for purpose? — Bill of Rights No. 8. ⁠"The Right to drive without being forced to answer radio messages and texts from Controllers whilst in motion"
Episode 3: Worse & Better Communication - "You can either blame—or learn—it's very hard to do both"

(a) TfL's failure to consider Human Factors in how Bus Door Controls are designed that makes Driver error inevitable, and (b) how to fix these known problems.

"killed on on by a Bus", inter alia, by "collisions on private land, noncollisions (e.g. death due to medical episodes or slips, trips and falls on a bus), incidents outside the Greater London boundary and death occurring after 30 days". 

Ezarhul Islam (73), who fell after a Go Ahead 191 Bus moved suddenly without warning in October 2015, but died while still in hospital in December 2015. Because Mr. Islam died 30 days after  his death—which resulted in the Coroner issuing a "Prevention of Future Deaths" Order in June 2016—TfL recorded his death as a "Medical" in origin and didn't include the incident in any official Road Casualty reporting, including Figure 17.  Since 1 January 2014, TfL has recorded 69 Fatalities with "Medical" serving as the cause. How many of these "Medical" deaths represent Bus Injury Victims like Mr. Islam, who died 30 days after the incident?  
Saba Mirza (31), who was critically injured on a Zebra Crossing by a Metroline Route 46 in November 2016 but, I understand, died while still in hospital in January 2021 (i.e., after 30 days). By the way, the collision incident that eventually killed Saba Mirza is not recorded in any of TfL's published Bus Safety Performance records, including "TfL Bus Drivers critically injuring pedestrians on Zebra Crossings". 
A Male Pedestrian (41) hit by a speeding Go Ahead Route 191 Bus at Edmonton Green Bus Station in February 2020. 
Melissa Burr (32) hit by a Go Ahead Route 507 Bus at Victoria Bus Station in August 2021. 
Stephen Mitchell (60), killed while trying to board a Go Ahead Route 363 Bus in Peckham in November 2022. Until London Assembly Member Keith Prince reported the fact that the Bus Driver was convicted for "causing death by driving without due care and attention" in 2025, on its website TfL previously recorded the incident as a non-fatal "Collision" Incident where the victim required "No Treatment".  Since 1 January 2014, TfL has recorded 3053 Bus Collision Incidents where the victim required "No Treatment".  How many of these incidents resulted in the death of the victim where the Bus Driver was convicted? 
Grace Mecaley (74) hit by Go Ahead Route 212 Bus at Walthamstow Bus Station in December 2023. 

'TfL does not receive ongoing updates on the status and health outcomes of people who were previously involved in bus incidents and has no information about the health status of members of the public up to eight years after an incident' 

"On 11 September 2019, a former TfL Board Director and Safety Panel Chair told the London Assembly Transport Committee and your Deputy Mayor for Transport: "We owe it to the victims of that accident [Sandilands] and we owe it to victims of accidents on the buses and on other parts of the network to get to the bottom of exactly how this organisation is run. How does it deal with this sort of situation? What happened? Why did it happen? How did they do that audit? What lessons can we learn about how to do audits? How can we make sure that we are delivering the radical transparency that is the only way to deliver Vision Zero? I am not trying to be difficult or unpleasant or cause problems, but I can tell you now that if you do not deal with that culture and if you do not have robust audit processes, you will get nowhere near to Vision Zero. Nowhere near to Vision Zero." Since (a) bus collisions remain at the same level (about 80 per day) as when you announced your Vision Zero Programme in July 2018 and (b) casualties from buses are now higher than when you took office, will you commit to a policy of "radical transparency" on bus safety?"

In your response, you stated —

"Transport for London (TfL) has no higher priority than the safety of its customers, staff, and those affected by its operations, and continues to strive to reach the ambitious Vision Zero targets."

I need not remind you that, 

• since you've been Mayor, your Vision Zero Target for Buses that "no one to be killed on or by a bus by 2030" has been going the other way.

• on 3 July 2025, your own Transport Commissioner admitted to the London Assembly that—

 "until this year...the Bus Companies would still be penalised if they curtailed or did not meet their performance requirements because of the hot weather or because they were taking action to support Driver Welfare"

• you will get nowhere near Vision Zero unless you compel TfL to deliver 'radical transparency' on Londons' failing Bus Safety Performance and unsafe Bus Driver Working Conditions.  

1) Issuing a Formal Apology to each of the families of Saba Mirza, Stephen Mitchell, Melissa Lamb and Grace Mecaley—all killed "on or by a bus" under your watch as Mayor and TfL Chair—with a full explanation as to why—since their loved ones' deaths "do not meet STATS19 criteria"—TfL did not include their incidents as part of (a) "the underpinning data source for all road safety policy and from which Transport for London (TfL) built its evidence base for the Bus Safety Standard (BSS)" (b)  "TfL's road safety targets and baseline" (c) in the determination of executives' bonuses for achieving safety targets in, respectively, 2016, 2021, 2022 and 2023, (d) Figure 17. 

2) Publishing a Consolidated Annual Figure for people "killed on or by a bus" in London. 

Your explanation as why you refuse to order TfL to perform the simple task of publishing a consolidated annual figure that shows all the people "killed on or by a bus" is, frankly, contemptuous of the families of the over 100 victims who—while you have served as Mayor and TfL chair—have been killed "on or by a bus", as well as of the at least 9698 victims who've been sent to hospital from preventable Bus-related injuries over the same period.  A truly just Vision Zero Policy would not impose on the families of victims—or on victims themselves—the obligation to interrogate TfL's dubious datasets in order to discern the actual number of how many people have been killed "on or by a bus" in London. Both you and TfL are wittingly adding insult to injury: have you no shame?

3) Instructing TfL to conduct a Independent Data Integrity Audit of all TfL's published Bus Safety Datasets

Since at least 2022, Keith Prince has been asking you instruct TfL to conduct an Independent Audit of the Integrity of TfL's published Bus Safety Performance Data. 

March 2025 - Vision Zero: Bus Safety Data Integrity Audit

November 2024- Vision Zero: Independent Data Integrity Audit of TfL Bus Safety Data

March 2022 - Independent Audit of TfL's Quarterly Bus Safety Data

"TfL will probably say 'we don't recognise this because nobody's brought this to our attention'.
"But if it has been brought to their attention and they're not doing anything about it, that's a very different thing."

Under your watch as Mayor and TfL Chair, you've presided over a Surface Transport Operation that has produced— 

• at least 100 deaths from preventable Bus Safety Incidents;
• 76 deaths of Bus Drivers from Covid-19; and, 
• 7 deaths from the 2016 Croydon Tram Crash at Sandilands.

"While Sadiq Khan has been mayor and TfL [Transport for London] chair, about every six weeks someone has been killed in a London bus safety incident. Three in four of these deaths are the result of a bus collision. In 2024 someone was killed in a preventable bus safety incident every three weeks. Except for a short period during the Covid-19 pandemic, recorded crashes have been stuck at an eerily predictable 80 bus crashes per day for the past five years."

• analyses of years of TfL's published casualty data reveal that TfL Buses—which (a) constitute about 1 percent of the vehicles on the road at any time, and (b) are solely contracted by TfL—were involved in 15 percent of all pedestrian fatalities from Road Vehicles in London in 2024, an increase from the ghastly 10 percent annual average from 2014-2023. 
• when benchmarked to its 'World City' peers by Imperial College, year-after-year London consistently appears at the bottom tercile for Bus Collisions. 

• every day over 3 people have been hospitalised from a preventable bus safety incident, 1 of which is due to a collision.
• deaths "on or by a bus" have risen from 12 in 2016 to 16 in 2024, despite at least an 8% fall in the number of bus miles driven. 
• at least 100 people have lost their lives from preventable safety incidents "on or by" TfL buses.  
• and—at least— 76 Bus Drivers lost their lives to Covid-19 and 7 passengers were killed in the Croydon Tram Crash, both safety catastrophes that, despite the many serious questions about TfL's poor oversight of these crises that remain outstanding, you are obviously desperate to close the books on

• inscribing the Bus Driver's Bill of Rights into TfL's Framework Bus Services Contract; and, 
• appointing an 'Independent Judge-Led Enquiry" to investigate TfL's Safety Culture 

Three "Rights" listed in the London Bus Drivers Bill of Rights —

• The Right to a safe work schedule without any forced overtime or loss of pay 
• The Right to a decent and proper rest break in the working day 
• ⁠⁠The Right to be treated with dignity and respect by our employers, TfL and the public 

— underscore the extent to which the system in which TfL negotiates, agrees and enforces its Bus Performance Contracts is broken. But there's something deeply broken about a Public Surface Transport System the compels its own workers to be complacent about Fatigue even before they start the job.

Among TfL's Bus Contractors a Fatigue-inducing Practice of forcing new Bus Drivers to sign away their right to a legal 48-hour working week has been quietly normalised. Drivers are compelled to give up this right—not after settling in and understanding the full implications of the job—but on Day One, during their Induction. 

And the form they're made to sign leaves no room for debate.

"As an Employee of [INSERT TfL BUS OPERATOR NAME HERE] , I agree of my own free will and individual choice to opt out of the average maximum working week of 48 hours contained within the Working Time Regulations 1998. If you wish to withdraw from this agreement, please speak to the Trainer on your Induction."

This document doesn't only reflect bureaucratic complacency: it is coercion wearing a smile.

The Illusion of "Free Will" to choose Working Hours.

The document's phrasing is deliberate: "I agree of my own free will and individual choice." This is legal theatre. A performance designed to bypass the spirit of worker protections by putting the burden of refusal on the most vulnerable: new Bus Driver hires.

This form: which asks New Bus Driver Hires to opt out of the legal 48-hour weekly working limit is given to the prospective employee before he or she even officially starts, usually a few days or a week ahead of his or her induction day. On Induction Day, the Operators assiduously check if all pre-employment forms—including this one—are completed and signed. If anything is missing, your application may be paused or even stopped altogether. For some documents, Bus Operators might offer assistance. But with this one, the approach is more blunt: "Sign it, and if you want to opt back in later, sort it out after you've started."

"I understand that this agreement will continue unless I decide to terminate it by giving four weeks notice in writing addressed to my Operations Manager." 

In plain English: if you don't want to agree now, you're either out of the running — or locked in for four weeks of whatever hours the company demands—with no guarantees of ever receiving a manageable schedule.  

This is not informed consent. This is institutional pressure hiding behind a paper shield.

No Perks. No Overtime Pay. No Choice.

Bus driving is already one of the most demanding jobs in London.  Drivers manage thousands of passengers a day, navigate unpredictable traffic, deal with verbal abuse and threats, and are still expected to maintain perfect punctuality despite impossible schedules. It's no wonder the industry is facing a recruitment and retention crisis.

And yet, instead of addressing these systemic issues — poor pay, long hours, safety risks, understaffing — TfL's solution has been to permit its Bus Contractors to lean harder on the people who show up every day. This opt-out form is a symptom of a deeper systemic disease:  tt reveals how TfL contracts its Bus Contractors to treat time, energy, and health as infinite resources that they can consume without human costs so that Bus Users are satisfied and Bus Companies are profitable. The opt-out form shows how easily "choice" becomes manipulation when the power dynamics are skewed entirely in favour of the unaccountable.  And this form proves that exploitation doesn't start after a London Bus Driver gets behind the wheel:  it starts the moment he or she is handed a pen.

The Fight for Change Begins with Awareness.

If the Mayor and TfL are serious about fixing London's well-evidenced record of failing Bus Safety Performance, they must start with Transparency.  The Mayor and TfL must prevent Bus Contractors from pretending that this opt-out form is a fair agreement.  They must stop Bus Operators from assigning "free will" to Bus Drivers decision to sign it when they know it's anything but.   And the Mayor, TfL and the Bus Operators must stop expecting workers to sacrifice their wellbeing in Silence.  London's 'world leading' Public Bus Network only runs because of its Drivers.  Without them, the city doesn't move.  The least these Drivers deserve is respect: and that starts with giving them a real choice about their working hours, not a rubber stamp that condemns them to a working life hobbled by Fatigue.

When 'Protection' Becomes Permission.

• That all Working Time Agreements present a real choice:  with a clear 'yes or no' checkbox.
• That opting in or out does not affect Bus Workers' Job Offers or Career Progression.
• That Bus Drivers can challenge unrealistic rotas without the fear of being disciplined or isolated by their managers.

When Unite the Union—the very institution that's meant to stand up for London's Bus Workers—has complacently accepted the Employer's line for decades, then something is deeply broken...and unjust.

The message is clear: if you want the job, you'll play by the rules that are already well stacked against you. And if those rules exhaust you, or endanger your well-being or others in your bus or on the road? That's your fault: you've already signed away your leverage.

What makes the current situation worse is the silence from those who should be shouting the loudest.  A Union that turns a blind eye, or worse, plays along, isn't protecting anyone. It's simply helping to keep TfL's contracted 'Killing Machine' running day-in, day-out.

This isn't about paperwork: it's about power. And until the Mayor and TfL start asking the right questions—and demanding real accountability from Bus Operators and Unite the Union—Bus Drivers will keep being pressured to drive fatigued and powerless to change things.

And increasing numbers of lives and livelihoods will be lost as a result of a Franchised Public Bus Operation—under the complete control of the Mayor of London—that refuses to make Driver Welfare and Public Safety a Priority.

Dear Caroline Russell,

RE: The Mayor's 7 May 2025 Response to the London Assembly's 13 February 2025 London Bus Driver 'Bill of Rights' Petition 

Kindly note that I am forced to write to you anonymously because the poor TfL Bus Safety Performance and Bus Driver Working Conditions issues I highlight publicly here today might get me fired from my job as a TfL Bus Driver.  In any case, this bit of public reporting of my concerns about the Mayor's and TfL's poor safety oversight of London's Contracted Bus Operation will certainly get me disciplined, and my family and I cannot risk that. 

I note the Mayor responded to your 13 February 2025 Submission of our Bill of Rights Petition (letter attached) on 7 May 2025.

Since you put yourself at the front of our 29 January 2025 Bill of Rights March from Victoria Station to Parliament, you know what 'Rights' we are demanding, i.e.,—

 1.⁠ ⁠The Right to a safe work schedule without any forced overtime or loss of pay

 2.⁠ ⁠The Right to a decent and proper rest break in the working day

 3.⁠ ⁠The Right to drive a safe and well-maintained vehicle

 4.⁠ ⁠The Right to clean, serviced toilet and rest facilities on all bus routes

 5.⁠ ⁠The Right to report safety concerns without fear of retribution from TfL or employers

 6.⁠ ⁠The Right, when seriously ill and covered by a doctor's note, to not be harassed into coming into work until fit to do so

 7.⁠ ⁠The Right to relevant and timely safety training

 8.⁠ ⁠The Right to drive without being forced to answer radio messages and texts from Controllers whilst in motion

 9.⁠ ⁠⁠The Right to have all company rules in writing and clearly displayed

10.⁠ ⁠⁠The Right to be treated with dignity and respect by our employers, TfL and the public

11.⁠ ⁠The Right to Working Air Cooling in our cabs in the summer heat 

12.⁠ ⁠The Right to Working Heaters in our cabs in the cold of winter

Because our lived experience proves that (a) we do not have these Rights and (b) we have no remedies to invoke when we are denied them by our employers, we are asking that they be inscribed into TfL's Framework Bus Contract so that the Rights are unambiguously established and will apply universally to all London Bus Drivers in a single, publicly-accessible document that the (1 January 2016) TfL Framework Bus Contract represents.

If you had the opportunity to scrutinise Deputy Mayor Seb Dance's 11 May 2025 Response to Bus Driver Activist Kevin Mustafa's 10 December 2024 Letter or any one of the Mayor's Responses to Questions 2025/0580 to 2025/0592 provided to Keith Prince AM from 28 February -12 March 2025, you'll see that the Mayor's 7 May 2025 Response to you is just the same regurgitation of the fact-free gaslighting that he, his Deputy and TfL have been dishing out since the Mayor's 21 January 2025 Response to Question 2025/0089 from Thomas Turrell AM.

Kindly note that even a cursory scrutiny of the Mayor's official reason for rejecting the Bill of Rights, i.e—

"Many aspects of the proposed 'Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights' are already covered by existing agreements, actions or legislation."

—will reveal City Hall's repeated refusals lack any granular evidence to support them.

Why? 

Because even a little scrutiny of what appears to be a hastily-assembled collection of factoids that purport to evidence the existence of the Bill of Rights, negates City Hall's and TfL's ill-conceived assertion that these Rights exist at all. 

Based on our lived experience as London Bus Drivers and thousands of facts on the public record thanks to dozens of Freedom of Information Requests, at least two London Assembly Transport Committee Investigations (2017 and 2024) and hundreds of Mayor's Questions since 2011, we are confident that "arm-waving" statements from City Hall and TfL like—

"Relevant legislation includes, but is not limited to, the Health and Safety at Work Act (1974), the Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations (1992), Working Time Regulations (1998), Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations (1999), and the Equality Act (2010)."

and

"Further regulation is provided by the need for all bus operating companies to hold a valid Public Service Vehicle Operator Licence and to adhere to requirements set by the Traffic Commissioner and administered by the Driving and Vehicle Standards Agency (DVSA)." 

and so on... 

— are intended solely to confuse the London Assembly and the public.

Will the London Assembly assiduously scrutinise all these statements from the Mayor, his Deputy and TfL? 

"already covered by existing 'agreements'"

• What agreements? 
• Between what parties? 
• Where are these agreements recorded and available for public scrutiny?
• Which "Right" or "Rights" contained in the Bill of Rights do these agreements to which the Mayor refers establish? 
• To which specific clause in which specific "agreements" can a London Bus Driver refer when he or she is denied the "Right" or "Rights" founded upon said agreement(s)?
• Do all these alleged agreements to which the Mayor refers apply uniformly across all of London's Bus Contractors and treat all London Bus Drivers equally? 

• What—exactly—is an "action"?  
• Where are said "actions" recorded, between whom are they agreed, and to whom do they apply? 
• Are these "actions" published and available for public scrutiny? 
• Which "Right" or "Rights" contained in the Bill of Rights do these "actions" to which the Mayor alludes establish? 
• To which specific clause in which specific "actions" can a London Bus Driver refer when he or she is denied the "Right" or "Rights" founded upon said "action(s)"?
• Do these "actions" apply uniformly across all of London's Bus Contractors and treat all London Bus Drivers equally?

If the Mayor continues to refuse to provide documentary evidence to support his claim about all the alleged "actions" he claims establish the existence and application of the Bill of Rights for all London Bus Drivers, isn't the Mayor merely gaslighting the London Assembly?

"already covered by existing...'legislation'"

• The Mayor cites various legislative acts but does not reference specific clauses, why? 
• Which "Right" or "Rights" contained in the Bill of Rights does this said legislation establish? 
• To which specific clause in which specific legislation can a London Bus Driver refer when he or she is denied the "Right" or "Rights" founded upon said legislative act(s)?
• If Bus Drivers are being denied Rights guaranteed by Legislative Acts, aren't TfL Bus Contractors breaking the law? 
• If the Mayor of London, as TfL Chair, is permitting TfL Bus Contractors to break the law, isn't he just an accomplice? 

If the Mayor continues to refuse to provide documentary evidence to support his claim about all the "legislation" that establishes the existence and application of the Bill of Rights for all London Bus Drivers, isn't the Mayor gaslighting you? More importantly—if what the Mayor has stated is true and can be backed up by evidence—is he knowingly permitting TfL Bus Contractors to break the law? 

As you know well, the Bill of Rights we're demanding derive directly from the lived experiences of London Bus Drivers. The Mayor claims we already enjoy them, but he refuses to cite:

(a) the Specific Clauses of the any Existing Agreements, Actions or Legislation that Guarantee London Bus Drivers those Rights 

and, more importantly—

(b) the Specific Remedies available to Bus Drivers when we are denied them.

As a publicly-elected official whose sole purpose is to scrutinise the Mayor of London and the institutions over which the Mayor has authority, we believe it is incumbent upon you and the London Assembly to reject the Mayor's contemptuous response and subject it to some meaningful scrutiny. 

The penultimate paragraph of the Mayor's letter to you—

"TfL encourages any London bus driver who feels his or her rights are being infringed to raise their concerns with their employer, their union, or TfL directly. This can also be done via an anonymous reporting system, The Confidential Incident Reporting & Analysis Service, which is available to all drivers."

—should provide you with some encouragement that being on 'the right side of history' on Bus Safety occasionally bears fruit. 

On 17 September 2014, your Green Party Predecessor Darren Johnson asked Mayor Boris Johnson a simple question about Bus Safety—

Unlike Tube Drivers, the drivers of buses in London do not have access to a Confidential Incident Reporting & Analysis System (CIRAS), where employees can confidentially register individual concerns about work colleagues, working  practices, and other activity which presents a safety hazard, or fails to apply good systems of risk management with the assurance that these safety concerns will be investigated by an independent body.   Will you immediately order TfL to make subscription to CIRAS a condition of continuing to be an approved supplier for TfL London bus contracts and other related services?

And the argument put forward by Mayor Boris Johnson to reject Darren Johnson AM's reasonable request  —

There are already robust systems for reporting and investigating safety issues and incidents across the bus network. Assurance is provided by audits of operator reporting and investigating procedures, as well as regular reviews of reported data. All London bus operators have their own established procedures in place.

— seems remarkably (and contemptuously) similar to Mayor Sadiq Khan's to you on 7 May.

As I suspect you already know, after further campaigning from Darren Johnson joined by Assembly Members from the Liberal Democrat (Caroline Pidgeon AM) and Conservative Parties (Richard Tracey AM, Victoria Borwick AM), Mayor Boris Johnson was shamed into extending Confidential Safety Incident Reporting to TfL Bus Drivers in January 2015  and—after TfL delayed (obstructed?) implementing the Mayor's order for a year—CIRAS was officially extended to Bus Drivers by TfL at its cost in January 2016.

Given the dozens of Mayor's Questions about the Bill of Rights Conservative Assembly Members Keith Prince AM, Neil Garratt AM and Thomas Turell AM have put forward since we started the Bill of Rights Campaign at TfL Headquarters on 5 November 2024, and additional questions from Liberal Democrat AM Hina Bokhari, from my simple Bus Driver's perspective it would appear that you've got at least a quorum of Assembly Members that would support you putting a Bill of Rights Motion in front of the Assembly for a debate and a vote.

To be honest, we are disappointed by the fact that, since 29 January 2025, you haven't been inspired to (a) ask any Mayor's Questions about the Bill of Rights or (b) present a Bill of Rights Motion to allow all Assembly Members from all Parties to reveal their public positions about our reasonable demands.   Now, more than ever, we need you to work with other London Assembly Members to pressure the Mayor to stop gaslighting the London Assembly about the Bus Drivers Bill of Rights.  Your predecessor Darren Johnson's success in obtaining Confidential Safety Incident Reporting for London Bus Drivers against Mayoral and TfL's public gaslighting is a good example of the kind of "about-face" that's possible when both facts and common sense are on your side. 

Given the fact that 2024 saw a doubling of 2023's number of people killed 'in or by a bus' , the Mayor's Vision Zero 'ambition' for that chilling number to be 'zero by 2030' appears to be nothing more than a virtue-signalling fantasy.  Much like the Confidential Safety Incident Reporting for London Bus Drivers that the Mayor of London and TfL once vociferously opposed but now are publicly cheerleading, we believe that the the Bill of Rights we're demanding is just common sense that the Mayor and TfL will come around to embrace when the public narrative they've been pushing is revealed, as it was with Confidential Incident Safety Reporting for London Bus Drivers, to be manifestly incorrect. 

You marched at the head of our procession to Parliament on 29 January 2025. 

You met us in front of City Hall on 13 February 2025 to receive our Bill of Rights Petition. 

We look forward to you to continue supporting us in our efforts to convince the Mayor about the lethality and negligence of his and TfL's public rejection of the London Bus Driver Bill of Rights.

Lives and Livelihoods are stake here:  we continue to expect that you'll remain on the 'right side of history' on the London Bus Drivers Bill of Rights. The facts, common sense, and London Bus Drivers are on that side too.

Yours sincerely,

—An Anonymous London Bus Driver

a) Well-evidenced and long-known Poor Working Conditions of London's Bus Drivers;b) Poor Operational Safety Performance of London Buses  

• An average of 3 people a day have been hospitalised from a preventable Bus Safety Incident, at least one of which involves a Bus Collision;
• About every 5-6 weeks, someone has been killed in a preventable Bus Safety Incident, mostly from Bus collisions. In 2024, there was such a death every 3 weeks.
• For the past decade, 1 in 10 Deaths from Road Traffic Incidents in London has involved a TfL Bus.  Based on TfL's published data it also appears that, Based on 2024's preliminary figures, we believe that chilling ratio shrank to 1 in 7.  Do you agree with me that is an appalling level of lethality for public service vehicles that represent less than 1 percent of the total number of vehicles driving on London's streets at any given time?
• Since this Mayor was elected, over 100 people have been killed in preventable Bus Safety Incidents, 70% from collisions. 

 1.⁠ ⁠The Right to a safe work schedule without any forced overtime or loss of pay 2.⁠ ⁠The Right to a decent and proper rest break in the working day 3.⁠ ⁠The Right to drive a safe and well-maintained vehicle 4.⁠ ⁠The Right to clean, serviced toilet and rest facilities on all bus routes 5.⁠ ⁠The Right to report safety concerns without fear of retribution from TfL or employers 6.⁠ ⁠The Right, when seriously ill and covered by a doctor's note, to not be harassed into   coming into work until fit to do so 7.⁠ ⁠The Right to relevant and timely safety training 8.⁠ ⁠The Right to drive without being forced to answer radio messages and texts from       Controllers whilst in motion 9.⁠ ⁠⁠The Right to have all company rules in writing and clearly displayed10.⁠ ⁠⁠The Right to be treated with dignity and respect by our employers, TfL and the public11.⁠ ⁠The Right to Working Air Cooling in our cabs in the summer heat 12.⁠ ⁠The Right to Working Heaters in our cabs in the cold of winter

"We are calling on you and the Mayor to meet with a delegation of Bus Drivers and Campaign Representatives in a Public Forum—like the London Assembly or House of Commons Transport Committees—to agree (a) a timeline where TfL will to write the Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights into its Framework Bus Contract and (b) how TfL plans to enforce and monitor these Rights being respected and adhered to by its Franchised Bus Operators  This meeting will need to be televised and recorded for public scrutiny.  We are not asking for what already exists. We are demanding what has never been delivered by TfL, its Franchised Bus Contractors or Unite the Union: a Safe, Respectful, Transparent and Accountable Working Environment for those who keep London moving on the UK's largest and longest-running Franchised Public Bus Network."

• Access to Toilets at the end of every Bus Route;
• Bus Cabs below 40c in the summer and above Freezing in the winter; and
• Working Schedules and Rotas that don't Ensure Driver Fatigue

• Publicly Acknowledge the crucial role of London Bus Drivers in London TravelWatch's and London Bus Alliance's future publications and/or public discussions about improvements to London's Bus Services;
• Assure the Public that they—like the LCC—recognise the direct link between Bus Driver Working Conditions and Bus Safety Performance;
• Campaign Publicly for the Mayor to write the London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights into TfL's Framework Bus Services Contract.

London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights
 1.⁠ ⁠The Right to a safe work schedule without any forced overtime or loss of pay 2.⁠ ⁠The Right to a decent and proper rest break in the working day 3.⁠ ⁠The Right to drive a safe and well-maintained vehicle 4.⁠ ⁠The Right to clean, serviced toilet and rest facilities on all bus routes 5.⁠ ⁠The Right to report safety concerns without fear of retribution from TfL or employers 6.⁠ ⁠The Right, when seriously ill and covered by a doctor's note, to not be harassed into coming into work until fit to do so 7.⁠ ⁠The Right to relevant and timely safety training 8.⁠ ⁠The Right to drive without being forced to answer radio messages and texts from Controllers whilst in motion 9.⁠ ⁠⁠The Right to have all company rules in writing and clearly displayed10.⁠ ⁠⁠The Right to be treated with dignity and respect by our employers, TfL and the public11.⁠ ⁠The Right to Working Air Cooling in our cabs in the summer heat 12.⁠ ⁠The Right to Working Heaters in our cabs in the cold of winter

Amendment 1. Confidential Safety Reporting — that any Bus Operator running a Public Bus Service enabled by the Bill be subscribed to a Confidential Safety Reporting Scheme like CIRAS or its equivalents. Thanks to a campaign I initiated in 2014, TfL agreed to fund CIRAS to extend its contracted Bus Drivers access to CIRAS in early 2016.
 Amendment 2. Bus Safety Incident Reporting — that any Public Transport Authority (PTA) taking control of its Public Bus Services through franchising or direct ownership will be obligated to publish its Bus Safety Performance Data every quarter. Thanks to my successful campaigning backed by Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Green Party London Assembly Members, TfL has been reluctantly publishing its Bus Safety Performance Data since 2014. 
 Amendment 3. Bus Driver Hours — that the Working Hours of Bus Drivers should conform to those of UK Lorry Drivers.  Amendment 4. Safety Qualifications of Public Transport Authority Officials — that any Public Transport Authority Official made responsible for Franchising Public Bus Services under the Act will possess basic IOSH and/or NEBOSH certifications.  

• Since 2014, about 1 in 10 deaths on the roads of London have involved TfL buses, a fleet that constitutes—corrected for mileage buses cover—about 1 percent of the vehicles on London's roads at any time. 

• International benchmarking undertaken by Imperial College consistently finds London in the lowest third of comparators for bus safety every year, suggesting that London has been— for years—the worst Bus Safety Performer in Europe. 

• In 2023 and based on STATS19 (undercount) data, TfL says that there were 258 people killed and seriously injured by buses in London—that is 258 families put through unimaginable trauma. Trust me, I know personally what that entails.  In 2017, TfL says that there were 259 people killed and seriously injured by buses in London.  After 6 years of a Vision Zero Programme much-touted by Lord Hendy's boss, the Senior Minister of Transport Heidi Alexander when she served as London Mayor Sadiq Khan's Deputy Mayor for Transport from 2018-2021, TfL's own published data shows, despite a reduction in total Bus Mileage, Buses and Bus Drivers, casualties from Preventable Bus Safety Incidents are now higher today than when Mayor Khan took office in 2016. 

• Buses and Coaches have killed, on average, about 20 pedestrians per year;

• Buses & Coaches have accounted for 3.4% of Total Pedestrian Fatalities in the United Kingdom but only account for 0.34% of the total number of vehicles in the UK and only 0.57% of the total vehicle miles in the UK;

• Accordingly, based on analysis of DfT's published data—Bus & Coach Lethality is 10 times higher than what these vehicles numbers on the road would predict and more than 5 times higher when these vehicles presence is corrected for their mileage;

London Bus Workers' Bill of Rights

1.⁠ ⁠The Right to a safe work schedule without any forced overtime or loss of pay2.⁠ ⁠The Right to a decent and proper rest break in the working day3.⁠ ⁠The Right to drive a safe and well-maintained vehicle4.⁠ ⁠The Right to clean, serviced toilet and rest facilities on all bus routes5.⁠ ⁠The Right to report safety concerns without fear of retribution from TfL or employers6.⁠ ⁠The Right, when seriously ill and covered by a doctor's note, to not be harassed into coming into work until fit to do so7.⁠ ⁠The Right to relevant and timely safety training8.⁠ ⁠The Right to drive without being forced to answer radio messages and texts from Controllers whilst in motion9.⁠ ⁠⁠The Right to have all company rules in writing and clearly displayed10.⁠ ⁠⁠The Right to be treated with dignity and respect by our employers, TfL and the public11.⁠ ⁠The Right to Working Air Cooling in our cabs in the summer heat 12.⁠ ⁠The Right to Working Heaters in our cabs in the cold of winter

(i) Confidential Safety Reporting; (ii) Timely and Accurate Safety Data Publishing by PTAs; (iii) Limiting bus driver hours; and, (iv) Ensuring Public Officials those designing, awarding and enforcing bus franchise contracts had safety qualifications 

'Traffic collision experts concluded that the Bus Driver began turning while his view was obscured by another bus' 

and "a pillar inside the bus also created a blind spot but the driver could have moved his head and upper body to look around it".

• a "turning bus"

• "obscured vision"

• a "pillar inside the bus" that "create a blind spot" that required the driver "to move his head and upper body to look around it" to see a pedestrian crossing the road in a designated pedestrian crossing.

• the unrelenting pressure from iBus Controllers on the Bus Driver to be timely and fast

• the Driver might haven't had access to a toilet for hours;

• the well-evidenced possibility that this 76 year-old driver might have been suffering from fatigue; 

"Implementing a Vision Zero programme" "The Secretary of State must work with bus service providers, trade unions, professional bodies, and appropriate training institutions to implement a Vision Zero programme within the bus sector, modelled on best practice in the industry, with the aim of eliminating serious injuries in the course of bus operations."

• Confidential Safety Reporting

• Bus Safety Incident Reporting

• Limiting Bus Driver Working Hours

• Safety Qualifications of PTA Officials

• Creation of Independent Bus Crash Investigation Branch

From: Kevin Mustafa 

Subject: Urgent Concerns Regarding Bus Safety and Driver Fatigue

Date: 23 March 2025 at 10:31:17 GMT

To: Lorna Murphy - TfL Director of Buses <lornamurphy@tfl.gov.uk>, Andy Lord - TfL Commissioner <AndyLord@tfl.gov.uk>

Cc: Tom Kearney, Neil Garratt <Neil.Garratt@london.gov.uk>, Keith Prince <Keith.Prince@london.gov.uk>, Caroline Russell <caroline.russell@london.gov.uk>, peter skinner <skinnerzboy@yahoo.co.uk>, Lorraine Bus Driver <lorraine.robertsoniz@hotmail.com>, "bishopmi@me.com" <bishopmi@me.com>, James Rossi <jamesrossi268@outlook.com>, Michael Liebreich <michael@liebreichassociates.com>, "billofrights@hotmail.com" <billofrights@hotmail.com>

Dear Lorna , Andy

Are you a Londoner? Do you ever come to London on business or for leisure, or as a tourist? Then this post is for you.

You might find the sight of a red London bus reassuring. You should find it terrifying. In an annual benchmarking study carried out by Imperial College, London scores consistently in the lowest tercile for safety, probably the least safe bus system of any major European city.

I was on the board of TfL and chaired the Safety Panel, and I know why: the system under which TfL contracts out bus services to private companies is "institutionally unsafe". Payment is tied entirely to the number of passenger route miles and to keeping up with the bus in front.

As congestion has increased and inflation has eaten bus company margins, pressure on bus drivers to speed has increased. Drivers work in conditions none of us would accept: lack of toilets, overheated cabs in summer; frozen cabs in winter; pressure to drive extra shifts up to 13-days in a row; insufficient time between shifts; and so on.

The Mayor and TfL have tried to deflect attention from all this, and from its impact on safety, but the data does not lie. As you can see from the attached chart, in 2024 there were 16 preventable deaths involving TfL buses - the highest number since 2009, Boris Johnson's first year as Mayor, despite bus journeys in London declining 17% over that period.

In 2017, as part of Vision Zero, Sadiq Khan announced that no one would be killed on or by a London bus by 2030. He has only been on track during the pandemic years, when London's buses ran reduced services. On current trend he will fail by a country mile.

Why does this matter today, and what can you do?

First, London bus drivers are campaigning for TfL and the bus companies to adopt, promote and enshrine in contracts a 12-point Bus Drivers Bill of Rights. There should be nothing controversial about it - all are basic rights that any decent person would want drivers to have. I feel so strongly about this, I have marched with the drivers, alongside Unite the Union. Everyone should sign their petition here.

Secondly, as it stands, the "Better Buses Bill" that the government is pushing through Parliament right now, would extend the "institutionally unsafe" London bus franchise model across the country. If you worry about London's appalling bus driver working conditions and pressure to speed leading to the same safety outcomes nationwide, please write to your MP, demanding that safety be put at the heart of the Bus Services [No. 2] Bill. 

• Demand regular, timely, independently audited safety data across all bus services in the UK. 
• Demand a guarantee of decent working conditions for drivers: toilets, access to a confidential whistleblower service, and the rest of the Bus Driver Bill of Rights.
• Demand an independent investigator for bus crashes in the UK, as we have RAIB for rail crashes and the AAIB for aircraft crashes.

You can find your MP here.

—Michael Liebreich

Originally Posted by the author on LinkedIn (19 Feb 2025).  Published here with the author's permission. 

Michael Liebreich served on the Board of Transport for London (2012-18) and as the Chair of the Board's Safety, Sustainability and Human Resources Panel (2016-18).  

1. London accounts for about one half of UK Bus Journeys and one quarter of the UK's Bus Fleet.

Source:  DfT 

2. TfL Buses are ten times more lethal than their presence on London's roads would predict; since 2014, 1 in 10 RTC Fatals and 1 in 10 Pedestrian Deaths in London have involved a TfL bus.

Sources:  Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly 

3. TfL's sole metric of bus contract performance is a time-based "Excess Waiting Time"/Headway calculation that independent benchmarking shows London—

• in the highest tercile of its 'world city' peers for Bus Punctuality and Profitability per Bus;
• in lowest tercile of its 'world city' peers for safety (collisions per km); 
• London has the least safe public bus system of any major European city.

Sources:  Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly; Imperial College

4. TfL has never conducted any analysis or safety risk assessment of its (a) Bus Franchise Model, (b) Bus Contract Financial Incentives or the (c) iBus System it uses to measure contract performance

Sources: Mayor of London, TfL; London Assembly 

5. Bus Driver Fatigue is a well-evidenced systemic problem, with the latest independent study showing 1 in 3 bus drivers reporting a near-miss due to fatigue and 1 in 6 Bus Drivers having fallen asleep at the wheel while driving a bus;

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly; Loughborough University 

6. Bus Collisions (2016-2023) - London averages of over 26,000 collisions annually (2023: over 28,000 - so, getting worse) from which — 

• about 1200 people are hospitalised per year
• 1 person is killed about every month (2024). 
• 80 to 100 people are sent to hospital per month from Preventable Bus Safety Incidents (80% Collisions, 20% Onboard Trips & Falls), 20 of these victims with serious and/or life-changing injuries;
• People killed and seriously injured from Bus Safety Incidents (80% Collisions, 20% Onboard Trips & Falls) are now higher than 2016 despite a) the total number of bus miles has fallen b) the total number of bus users has fallen (c) the total number of buses in London's contracted bus fleet has fallen (d) the total number of Bus Drivers has fallen (e) since 2016, the Mayor of London has announced 3 'world leading' Bus Safety Programmes and a Vision Zero Programme.

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly

7. 25% of London Bus Routes don't have a toilet at 1 end for Bus Drivers.

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly

8. TfL has agreed with Bus Operators and Unite the Union that Bus Drivers don't need a toilet on any route round trip that lasts up to 150 minutes - this was agreed without a single bit of data (i.e, Human Factors Study, HSE Risk Assessment).

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly

9. TfL has evidence of (at least) 12 million (est.) Annual Bus Speeding incidents on file that it does not share with the Police; From January 2017 to January 2024, nearly half (44%) the Bus Collision Deaths occurred in 20mph (or less) zones.

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly

10. Since January 2016, more than 1 pedestrian per month has been injured by a TfL Bus hitting them in a zebra or pelican crossing.

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly

11. Since 1 April 2015, an average of 6 people per month (2022-23: 8 per month- getting worse) have been injured after being struck by a Bus Wing Mirror. 

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly

12. TfL received the highest Health & Safety Fine ever in July 2023 for HSE Failures on the Croydon Tram, a contracted surface transport operation that was founded, managed and monitored by TfL's Bus Executives.

Sources: Department of Justice; Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly; Press Reports

13. While Sadiq Khan has been Mayor, 16 Pedestrians have been killed or seriously injured while in Traffic "Refuges";

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly

14. TfL does not report Law-Breaking by Bus Drivers to the Metropolitan Police for, inter alia—

• Running Red Lights
• Speeding

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly

15. TfL Bus Drivers had the highest rate of death (per 100 thousand) from Covid-19 for any UK Profession (that includes Doctors, Nurses and Healthcare workers)—

• Over Two-Thirds of the TfL Bus Drivers who died from Covid-19 did so after the first Lockdown;
• TfL data shows Bus Drivers were still dying from Covid-19 through 2022, after which it stopped collecting this information; 
• TfL has never requested any of its Bus Operators to provide a Covid-19 Garage Risk Assessment.

Sources: Mayor of London; TfL; London Assembly; University College London

Notes to Sources:

1. Analysis of published DfT Data— 

In March 2023, 30,154 buses were operated by local bus services in England, with 8,788 of them in London

 

https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/annual-bus-statistics-year-ending-march-2023/annual-bus-statistics-year-ending-march-2023

 

2.  Analysis Data Extracted from TfL's "Casualties in London" Reports; DfT Annual Bus Statistics; TfL "Travel in London" Reports; London Assembly Investigations; Mayor's Questions

"Buses contracted to Transport for London (TfL) constitute approximately 2% of total motorized road traffic in Greater London. This includes all buses, not just TfL-contracted ones, but TfL buses dominate the category."

 

https://content.tfl.gov.uk/technical-note-07-what-are-the-trends-and-patterns-of-bus-and-coach-traffic.pdf?t&utm_source=perplexity

 

"The percentage of TfL buses in total traffic has seen fluctuations over the years. In 2019/20, buses constituted about 1.2% of motorized road traffic in Greater London. This percentage dropped significantly during the pandemic in 2020/21 to 0.4%, reflecting reduced public transport usage. By 2022/23, the percentage had rebounded to around 1.5%. This indicates a recovery trend but still not reaching pre-pandemic levels."

 

https://content.tfl.gov.uk/travel-in-london-2023-trends-in-public-transport-demand-and-operational-performance-acc.pdf?t&utm_source=perplexity

London Assembly: https://www.london.gov.uk/about-us/londonassembly/meetings/documents/s110115/Appendix%201%20-%20Letter%20from%20Tom%20Kearney%20received%2015%20December%202023.pdf

3. Mayor's Questions, TfL's published Bus Performance Data, Internal Bus Operator Communications

https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/refusal-benchmark-londons-safety-performance-world-city-peers

5 Year Data (2015-2019)

 

https://www.london.gov.uk/questions/sites/default/files/3828%20Refusal%20to%20Benchmark%20Londons%20safety%20performance%20attachment.pdf

4. https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/vision-zero-tfls-bus-tendering-system-and-ksis-bus-safety-incidents

5.  http://content.tfl.gov.uk/bus-driver-fatigue-report.pdf 

6.  https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/publications-and-reports/bus-safety-data

7.  https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/lack-toilet-dignity-london-bus-drivers-name-borough-where-toilet-not-provided-end-bus-route

8. https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/negligence-and-toilet-priority-classification-agreed-between-tfl-unite-union-and-its-bus-contractors

9. https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/speed-compliance-tool-information-contained-recent-go-ahead-london-training-video; 

https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/bus-collision-deaths-20mph-or-lower-zones-2016-q1-2024;

https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/vision-zero-speed-compliance-tool-data-and-ksi-incidents

10. https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/nimi-reports-and-tfl-bus-drivers-critically-injuring-pedestrians-zebra-crossings-1-january-2016-11

11. https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/vision-zero-pedestrians-struck-bus-mirrors-1-january-2018-30-september-2023

12. https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/R-v-TfL-270723.pdf

13. https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/vision-zero-bus-collision-ksis-crossing-islands

14. https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/signal-passed-danger-spad-3; 

https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/vision-zero-speed-compliance-tool-data-and-ksi-incidents

15. https://content.tfl.gov.uk/initial-assessment-of-london-bus-driver-mortality-from-covid-19.pdf;

https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/number-bus-workers-who-died-covid-19-march-2020-november-2023;

https://www.london.gov.uk/who-we-are/what-london-assembly-does/questions-mayor/find-an-answer/update-employers-bus-workers-who-died-covid-19-march-2020-june-2023

By email and blog post

10 December 2024

Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London and TfL Chair
City Hall
Kamal Chunchie Way
London E16 1ZE 

cc: Transport Commissioner; Deputy Mayor for Transport; Deputy Mayor for Social Justice and Communities, London Victims' Commissioner; Walking and Cycling Commissioner; TfL Board Secretariat; TfL SSHR Panel Secretariat; London Assembly Transport Committee Members; Tom Kearney (@comadad)

Dear Mr. Mayor,

On 3 December I received a response (below) to my 29 October Open Letter (TfL's 'Safety Scandal' will be your Legacy! An Open Letter to the Mayor of London from Kevin Mustafa) from your Deputy Seb Dance that confirmed to me that both TfL and you appear to be incapable of showing either the compassion or the concern that are urgently required to reform TfL's "institutionally unsafe" Bus Operation. 

In order to ensure that TfL Bus Drivers are provided with working conditions that will allow them to drive safely and with duty of care, as Mayor of London and TfL Chair, you have both the legal authority and statutory responsibility to incorporate the London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights into London's Framework Bus Services Contract.  But your longstanding refusal to honour the previous Mayor's 1 February 2016 commitment to "update TfL's bus contracts to include new safety incentives" within "three months" confirms that both Bus Drivers' and the public's safety are not your priorities. 

Frankly speaking, I know that London's Bus Drivers believe that your refusal to replace TfL's "Time is Money" Bus Contract incentives with those that protect Bus Driver Working Conditions is a betrayal of the principles upon which the Labour Party and the union movement that created it are founded.  I am convinced that your failures to act as a prudent and responsible TfL Chairman have cost the lives of at least (now) 87 people in preventable Bus Safety Incidents, as well as 76 Bus Drivers from Covid-19 during your time in office. While your allies in the London Labour Party ignore TfL's Safety Scandal, London's Bus Drivers will not be letting you and your Deputy bamboozle them with the kind of gaslighting so evident in your Deputies' public statements over the years. 

And we will not stop until you (a) write The London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights into TfL's Framework Bus Contract and (b) ensure these commonsense actions are undertaken by TfL and its Bus Contractors without delay.

Yours sincerely,

Kevin Mustafa

Attachment 1: London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights

Attachment 2: 3 December 2024 Letter from Deputy Mayor, Transport

London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights

1. The Right to a safe work schedule without any forced overtime or loss of pay

2. The Right to a decent and proper rest break in the working day

3. The Right to drive a safe and well-maintained vehicle

4. The Right to clean, serviced toilet and rest facilities on all bus routes

5. The Right to report safety concerns without fear of retribution from TfL or employers

6. The Right, when seriously ill and covered by a doctor's note, to not be harassed into coming into work until fit to do so

7. The Right to relevant and timely safety training

8. The Right to drive without being forced to answer radio messages and texts from Controllers whilst in motion

9. ⁠The Right to have all company rules in writing and clearly displayed

10. ⁠The Right to be treated with dignity and respect by our employers, TfL and the public

11. The Right to Working Air Cooling in our cabs in the summer heat 

12. The Right to Working Heaters in our cabs in the cold of winter

Remember Remember the 5th of November. 

Thanks to you London Bus Drivers, I know I sure will.

Back on 18 September 2013, I attended a meeting here in Palestra House initiated by Victoria Borwick AM and hosted by the then-MD for Surface Transport, Leon Daniels, now a Director of TfL Bus Contractor RATP. 

At that meeting, Daniels proudly announced that the reason why TfL's management of London's Public Bus Services was so successful was because its Bus Contracts work on a single overriding principle that "Time is Money", which guaranteed faster and more reliable bus journey times for London's Bus Users.

Thanks to Victoria Borwick's successful lobbying of Mayor Boris Johnson, we now have over ten years of published TfL Bus Safety Performance Data that clearly indicates how those "Time is Money" Contracts are doing—

• An average of three people a day are hospitalised from a preventable Bus Safety Incident, at least one of which is a collision;
• About every five to six weeks, someone is killed in a preventable Bus Safety Incident, mostly from collisions; 
• For the past decade, one of every ten Deaths from Road Traffic Collisions in London has involved a TfL Bus.
• For the past decade, one of every Deaths of Pedestrians from Road Traffic Collisions in London has involved a TfL Bus. 
• Since this Mayor was elected, at least eighty-seven people have been killed in preventable Bus Safety Incidents, mostly collisions. 
• This year, over 1 person per month has been killed in a preventable Bus Safety Incident, mostly collisions.

But London's Bus Users are happy that London Buses are frequent and reliable and—quite often— too fast.

The people in the building behind us don't often advertise the lethal trends contained in TfL's published data, but—at long last— London's press is starting to take an interest.  

In addition to the Mayor's "Vision Zero" Programme, TfL also crows about the at least four 'world leading' Bus Safety initiatives it's announced since 2016.  But since TfL's own published data reveals that the number of people killed and seriously injured from preventable bus safety incidents is now higher than when this Mayor took office in May 2016, it's clear to anyone who bothers to pay attention that none of TfL's 'world leading' Bus Safety programmes are working. 

Why? 

Because the "Time is Money" Financial Incentives in TfL's "Quality Incentive [Bus] Contracts" haven't changed since they were first rolled out by TfL in the summer of 2001. 

And because Headway and Mileage still serve as the only performance metrics in TfL's "Time is Money" Bus Contracts, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out if TfL is financially incentivising its Bus Contractors to prioritise Headway and Mileage—while their Buses share roads with increasing numbers of cars, lorries, cyclists, pedestrians and scooters—that London Bus Drivers' ability to drive with duty of care is, frankly, impossible.  

And TfL blame the Victims and Bus Drivers for the tens of thousands of preventable Bus Safety Incidents that are the inevitable result of "Time is Money" Bus Contract Incentives.   

Inevitable? 

Yes! Inevitable.

You see? Bus Operators have long told us that sixty percent of the cost of running a bus is the cost of the Driver.

In the "Time is Money" Bus Contract environment that has prevailed in London since 2001, any money earned by the Bus Operator, and any time saved to make the Bus System more efficient, is "time" that is being robbed from the Bus Driver to do his or her job safely and with duty of care.

• Not enough time to use the loo. 
• Not enough time for recovery on stand time.
• Not enough time to conduct first use checks.
• Not enough time to ensure that all passengers are seated safely before departing. 
• Not enough time spent at a Bus Stop to pick up a passenger in a wheelchair.
• Not enough time spent at home with family, de-stressing, resting or sleeping. 

The Framework Contract TfL uses today is dated 1 January 2016.

That means TfL's Bus contracts are silent about—

• all the TfL's 'world leading' Bus Safety Initiatives the Mayor of London's announced since 1 February 2016.
•  Vision Zero.

But these Bus Contracts are very loud about "Time is Money".

London's Poor Working Conditions and London's ghastly record of Bus Safety Performance will never change until this Mayor puts an end to TfL's "Time is Money" Contracts. Just like the previous Mayor of London promised to do 'over the next three months' on 1 February 2016. 

In fact, the twelve simple "Rights" shown in the London Bus Driver Bill of Rights—

1. The Right to a safe work schedule without any forced overtime or loss of pay

2. The Right to a decent and proper rest break in the working day

3. The Right to drive a safe and well-maintained vehicle

4. The Right to a clean, serviced toilet and rest facilities on all bus routes

5. The Right to report safety concerns without fear of retribution from TfL or employers

6. The Right, when seriously ill and covered by a doctor's note, to not be harassed into coming into work until fit to do so

7. The Right to relevant and timely safety training

8. The Right to drive without being forced to answer radio messages and texts from Controllers whilst in motion

9. ⁠The Right to have all company rules in writing and clearly displayed

10. ⁠The Right to be treated with dignity and respect by our employers, TfL and the public

11. The Right to Working Air Cooling in our cabs in the summer heat 

12. The Right to Working Heaters in our cabs in the cold of winter 

—provide perfect evidence of the fact that TfL Bus Contracts have been taking the time away from London's Professional Bus Drivers that's required to perform their jobs safely and with duty of care, and converting that time (i.e., "money") saved into profits for Bus Operators.

The Bill of Rights being demanded by London Bus Drivers are just Human Rights that TfL's "Time is Money" Bus Contracts have taken away from them just so London's Buses are convenient for Bus Users.

And now London Bus Drivers have decided that the "time" for being abused by these "Time is Money" Bus Contracts must end NOW.

It's about time. 

It's always been about time.

Thank you for your time today.

By email and blogpost

Elly Baker, Chair

London Assembly Transport Committee

City Hall

Kamal Chunchie Way

London E16 1ZE

1 November 2024

cc: London Assembly Transport Committee Members, Tom Kearney #LondonBusWatch

RE: 5 November London Bus Drivers' Protest at TfL Headquarters - Open Letter

With the support of Unite the Union, on Tuesday, 5 November I will join many London Bus Drivers in a march and demonstration at TfL Headquarters to hold Sadiq Khan to account for the 'Safety Scandal'  that has resulted in the deaths of at least 86 people from Bus Safety Incidents and 76 London Bus Drivers from Covid-19 while he has served as TfL Chair and Mayor of London. 

We are demanding that TfL and the Mayor immediately accept a London Bus Drivers' 'Bill of Rights' that I've attached for your information and review. 

While I still await your direct response my 26 June Open Letter, if you study the Bill of Rights and what I have requested the Transport Committee to investigate, i.e.—

• The Contradiction between TfL's Bus Contract Timeliness Incentives and Speed Limits;
• TfL's Refusal to Require Independent Bus Crash Investigations;
• TfL's Failure to conduct Risk and/or Human Factors Assessments of Bus Driver Working Conditions that are known to have a direct impact upon Safety Performance.

—you might appreciate that Bus Drivers are not going to wait months or years until the Transport Committee deigns to get around to scrutinising TfL and the Mayor for creating and maintaining working conditions where we cannot operate our vehicles safely and with duty of care.  

I am pleased Unite the Union is supporting this entirely London Bus Workers'-initiated Direct Action next week. If you lead the Transport Committee to investigate the issues I raised in my 26 June Open Letter, you will discover why our grassroots protest is so necessary.

I await your direct reply to my 26 June Open Letter.

Yours sincerely,

Lorraine Robertson

Attachment: London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights

London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights

1. The Right to a safe work schedule without any forced overtime or loss of pay

2. The Right to a decent and proper rest break in the working day

3. The Right to drive a safe and well-maintained vehicle

4. The Right to clean, serviced toilet and rest facilities on all bus routes

5. The Right to report safety concerns without fear of retribution from TfL or employers

6. The Right, when seriously ill and covered by a doctor's note, to not be harassed into coming into work until fit to do so

7. The Right to relevant and timely safety training

8. The Right to drive without being forced to answer radio messages and texts from Controllers whilst in motion

9. ⁠The Right to have all company rules in writing and clearly displayed

10. ⁠The Right to be treated with dignity and respect by our employers, TfL and the public

11. The Right to Working Air Cooling in our cabs in the summer heat 

12. The Right to Working Heaters in our cabs in the cold of winter

By email and blog post

29 October 2024

cc: Transport Commissioner; Deputy Mayor for Transport; Deputy Mayor for Social Justice and Communities, London Victims' Commissioner; Walking and Cycling Commissioner; TfL Board Secretariat; TfL SSHR Panel Secretariat; London Assembly Transport Committee Members; Tom Kearney (@comadad)

Dear Mr. Mayor,

With the support of Unite the Union, at 1100 on Tuesday, 5 November I will be leading London Bus Drivers in a march from Unite the Union's Regional London Office in Islington down to TfL Headquarters on Blackfriars. When we arrive at Palestra House, we will demonstrate to hold you and TfL to account for the 'Safety Scandal' that has resulted in the deaths of at least 86 people from Bus Safety Incidents and 76 London Bus Drivers from Covid-19 while you have served as TfL Chair and Mayor of London. 

I woke up to your 'Safety Scandal' in Spring 2020, while I was working as a Bus Driver Driver for a Singapore-based London Bus Contractor. While my colleagues across London fell ill and died from Covid-19, I couldn't help but notice that Company Managers and TfL officials, had effectively, vanished.  

I've since learned that, in April 2020, while—

• my employer had already distributed masks in February to its transport employees in Singapore; and,  
• TfL was already distributing masks to its own employees;

—TfL was telling Unite the Union "masks not necessary". I've also learned TfL never requested copies of Covid-19 Risk Assessments from its Bus Contractors. 

Like many other Bus Drivers, I am convinced that my colleagues had the highest rate of deaths from Covid-19 in the United Kingdom in April 2020 because of your and TfL's well-evidenced failures to use the powers you had—and had already exercised to protect TfL employees—to save London's Bus Drivers. 

Since that traumatic time, I've had the opportunity to—

• to speak with TfL officials in person about their failure to protect Bus Drivers during Covid;
• exchange letters with your Deputy Mayor about the "Culture of Fear" TfL permits on its contracted Bus Operation which prevents Bus Drivers reporting their well-founded concerns about safety problems to their managers or TfL; 
• be gaslighted by you about Poor Bus Driver Working Conditions on James O'Brien's "Speak to Sadiq",

Like you, I've also had the opportunity to read—

• your responses to hundreds of Mayor's Questions about Bus Safety (dozens of which were submitted on my behalf); 
• three London Assembly Transport Committee Bus Safety Investigations; 
• three 'world leading' Bus Safety Programme announcements by TfL; 
• your own "Vision Zero" announcement

—and I 'm convinced that your and TfL's constant refrain that, for Buses, "Safety is TfL's first priority"  is just a lie you've made for media consumption.

Why? 

Because TfL's latest Framework Contract for Bus Services in London—dated 1 January 2016—has zero requirements for safety performance—

• TfL Bus Contracts contain nothing about 'world leading' Bus Safety Programmes
• TfL Bus Contracts contain nothing about Vision Zero

But TfL Bus Contracts contain everything about the absolute requirement for London Buses to run On Time, Frequently and Efficiently for the convenience of London's Bus Users and for the benefit of Bus Operator Shareholders. 

Perhaps that explains why— 

• the number of people killed and injured by Buses is higher now than when you took in May 2016;
• so many of my colleagues fell ill snf died from Covid-19;
• TfL chooses to mislead Londoners about the actual number of people killed and injured in preventable Bus Safety Incidents;
• Bus Drivers report that Driver Fatigue, Lack of Toilet Dignity and Unsafe Bus Cab Temperatures are more prevalent today than ever before;
• Bus Drivers today must demand the basic human rights shown in the London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights I've attached for your information and immediate approval. 

Please look closely at the Rights London Bus Drivers require today so that they can drive safely and with duty of care on London's increasingly congested-roads.  

As TfL Chair since May 2016, aren't you the least bit ashamed that Bus Drivers even feel compelled to march to TfL Headquarters on 5 November to demand these Human Rights to work safely on a contracted Bus Operation that reports to you?  

If you continue to refuse London Bus Drivers this Bill of Rights, TfL's Safety Scandal will be your Legacy. 

Yours sincerely,

Kevin Mustafa

Attachment: London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights

London Bus Drivers' Bill of Rights

1. The Right to a safe work schedule without any forced overtime or loss of pay

2. The Right to a decent and proper rest break in the working day

3. The Right to drive a safe and well-maintained vehicle

4. The Right to clean, serviced toilet and rest facilities on all bus routes

5. The Right to report safety concerns without fear of retribution from TfL or employers

6. The Right, when seriously ill and covered by a doctor's note, to not be harassed into coming into work until fit to do so

7. The Right to relevant and timely safety training

8. The Right to drive without being forced to answer radio messages and texts from Controllers whilst in motion

9. ⁠The Right to have all company rules in writing and clearly displayed

10. ⁠The Right to be treated with dignity and respect by our employers, TfL and the public

11. The Right to Working Air Cooling in our cabs in the summer heat 

12. The Right to Working Heaters in our cabs in the cold of winter

• The Contradiction between TfL's Bus Contract Timeliness Incentives and Speed Limits;
• TfL's Refusal to Require Independent Bus Crash Investigations;
• TfL's Failure to conduct Risk and/or Human Factors Assessments of Bus Driver Working Conditions that are known to have a direct impact upon Safety Performance.

"That this RMT National Bus Workers Industrial Organising Conference calls upon the RMT N.E.C. to support and campaign for an independent inquiry about the safety of the London Contracted Bus Market Model that is being adopted by other UK cities. This conference notes that, while London's Contracted Bus Market Model is being adopted by other cities and regions throughout the UK, the London Assembly and independent campaigners have published well evidenced reports showing that TTL's contracted bus operation is as described by a former TfL board member and safety panel chair in evidence submitted to the London Assembly in 2020, "Institutionally unsafe". 

Over the 5 year period from 2016-2021, from collisions involving a TfL bus, an average of two people per day have been sent to hospital and 1 person has been killed every four to six weeks, an egregious bus safety performance record that places London in the lowest quartile for bus safety performance when independently benchmarked to its world city peers. Added to this appalling bus safety performance record is the fact that during the COVID pandemic, drivers died at twice the rate as expected based on age, ethnicity and home post code. 

Based on the London Model's well evidenced poor safety performance record, this conference calls upon the RMT N.E.C. to ask the House of Commons to launch an independent Inquiry of the systematic safety problems associated with TfL's Contracted Bus Market Model." 

• London is home to the largest franchised Bus Operation in the United Kingdom: TfL Bus Franchise Contracts account for 50 percent of UK Bus Journeys conveyed by 25 percent of the country's Bus Fleet;
• On 11 April 2024, Labour's shadow transport secretary, Louise Haigh MP set out the party's plans for a better bus network across England, with a promise— "to allow every community across the country to take back control of local bus services"—and specifically cited London as a model;
• In the words of former TfL Board Director and Safety Panel Chair Michael Liebreich, TfL's Bus Franchise Model is "Institutionally Unsafe";
• Since 2007, TfL's own published data shows that—year-on-year—London buses have accounted for 10% of all of London's road fatalities and about 10% of all pedestrian fatalities in London despite Buses' presence on the road over this period having declined from constituting about 3% to about 1% of all vehicles on the road at any given time;
• TfL's sole measure of bus contract performance is a time-based "Excess Waiting Time" calculation which Independent benchmarking shows London—
• in the highest tercile of its 'world city' peers for Bus Punctuality and Profitability per Bus;
• in lowest tercile of its 'world city' peers for safety (collisions per km): based on this published independent annual benchmark data, London appears to have the least safe bus system of any major European city;
• TfL has never conducted a safety risk assessment of the Bus Franchise Model or its Bus Contract Financial Incentives;
• 1 in 5 of the London Bus Drivers surveyed by Loughborough University (2017) indicated that they had to fight sleepiness at least 2-3 times a week, and about 1 in 4 had a 'close call' due to fatigue in the past 12 months;
• For decades, TfL's contracted Bus Operation has averaged over 26,000 Bus collisions annually—in 2023, TfL recorded over 28,000—from which
• about 1200 people are injured every year;
• 1 person is killed about every six weeks; 
• 80 to 100 people are sent to hospital every month from Preventable Bus Safety Incidents (80% Collisions, 20% Onboard Trips & Falls), over 20 of these victims with serious and/or life-changing injuries;
• Over one quarter of London Bus Routes don't have a toilet for Bus Drivers at one end of the route;
• TfL has agreed with Bus Operators and Unite the Union that Bus Drivers don't need a toilet on any route round trip that lasts up to 150 minutes — this 'criteria' was agreed without a Human Factors or Risk Assessment;
• TfL has evidence of (at least) 12 million (est.) Annual Bus Speeding incidents on file that it does not share with the Police;
• Since January 2016, more than 1 pedestrian per month has been injured by a TfL Bus hitting them in a zebra or pelican crossing; 
• Since 1 April 2015, an average of 6 people per month (2022-23: 8 per month- getting worse) have been injured after being struck by a Bus Wing Mirror;
• TfL received the highest Health & Safety Fine ever in July 2023 for HSE Failures on the Croydon Tram, a contracted surface transport operation that was founded, managed and monitored by TfL's Bus executives;
• Transport for London (TfL) does not require the bus operating companies to share copies of their risk assessments covering activities within their garage environments. This includes any that were created or updated as a result of Covid-19.
• despite the facts that—
• the total number of bus miles in London has declined;
• the total number of bus users in London has declined;
• the total number of buses in London's contracted bus fleet has declined;
• the total number of Bus Drivers in London has declined, and, 
• since 2016, the Mayor of London has announced 3 'world leading' Bus Safety Programmes and a Vision Zero Programme;

—the number of people killed and seriously injured from Bus Safety Incidents are now higher than 2016. 

• The Contradiction between TfL's Bus Contract Timeliness Incentives and Speed Limits;
• TfL's Refusal to Require Independent Bus Crash Investigations;
• TfL's Failure to conduct Risk and/or Human Factors Assessments of Bus Driver Working Conditions that are known to have a direct impact upon Safety Performance;

What progress has the union made on putting this Resolution into effect? 

If the answer is "none", I'd like to underscore why such an Independent Inquiry is critical today and to provide you with some encouragement—and perhaps some useful data—to ensure that such an Independent Inquiry is conducted, if not by the Commons Transport Committee, then perhaps by the RMT or the broader UK Trade Union movement.

The 2017 Bus Services Act gave devolved regional authorities the right to contract public Bus Services from private Bus Operators under terms and conditions written, negotiated and enforced by these local authorities, something London's Mayor has been doing through TfL since 2000.   As you know, the London Bus Franchise Model was recently adopted by Manchester's Mayor Andy Burnham, much to the acclaim of the national press, the Labour Party and its supporters. 

In fact, yesterday's Labour Party "Better Buses" announcement by its Shadow Transport Secretary reaffirms its support for the London Bus Franchise Model, e.g. —

"Where bus franchising is in place, in London and Greater Manchester, buses have thrived."

— and further promises—"to allow every community to take back control of their buses by removing barriers that currently limit bus franchising powers only to metro mayors."

As I have concluded from investigating London's long experience of having Mayoral control over Bus Services, buses "thriving" really means that the politicians who oversee London's public bus network put Bus Passengers' convenience ahead of everyone else's safety, including Bus Drivers' and other Road Users', pedestrians' especially. 

The London Bus Franchise Model is "Institutionally Unsafe"

London's quarter-century experience with Mayoral control of the bus public network has shown that, essentially, Bus Passengers only care if their Bus is Cheap, Convenient and Timely. 

For decades, that 'Holy Trinity' has served as TfL's overwhelming priority in its contracting of Bus Services in London, a city which accounts for about 50% of UK Bus Journeys and 25% of the country's Bus Fleet.

The fact that these cheap, convenient and timely London Buses—

• share the roads with growing numbers of other road users—increasingly on two wheels and their feet —who have a right to consider their journey just as important as Bus Users'; 

• are driven by living, thinking and feeling human beings; 

• impose negative externalities like pollution, particularly from the majority of London Buses running on diesel: a whopping 77 percent of TfL's Contracted Bus Fleet run solely on diesel (45 percent) or are diesel hybrids (32 percent), which will continue to pollute for decades; 

• because of their size and mass, carry a much higher risk of death and serious injury from crashes, which is borne out by the fact that TfL buses—about 2% of total traffic—have been involved in 1 in about every 10 of all London road fatalities since 2007.  Note: in June 2016, TfL's (now Chief Safety Officer) told the Parliamentary Advisory Council for Transport Safety "Buses are four times more likely to be involved in a KSI collision with a pedestrian than would be expected for their share of traffic"—and TfL's published data reveals that people killed or seriously injured (KSI) from Bus Collisions have increased since 2016. 

— rarely register on most Bus Users', TfL and Bus Company Bosses' and London politicians' radar screens. 

As a result of the London Bus Franchise Model's contract priorities, the Bus System's Operational Safety Performance and Driver Working Conditions have suffered because if London's Mayors and local politicians actually made these a priority, they'd find themselves in direct conflict with a longstanding systemic principle that "Time is Money" which has long served as the only public bus service performance metric in London that matters. TfL's sole measure of public Bus Contract Performance is for its Bus Contractors to stick to the costs based on  running times they've contractually agreed with TfL.

Remember: 60% of the cost of running a public Bus is the Driver, so there is a systemically-reinforced disincentive for TfL and its contractors to add any extra bus drivers to routes where any new or emerging reality conflicts with (a) costs and (b) profits directly tied to already-contracted Bus Service Performance levels.  Instead, TfL and its Bus Operators  choose to put pressure on Bus Drivers to compensate for what former TfL Board Director and Safety Panel Chair Michael Liebreich has evidenced is an "Institutionally Unsafe" contractual arrangement. And this pressure means Bus Drivers work while fatigued, distracted by System Controllers and frequently exceed the legal speed limit just so that their Bus Operator employer can meet TfL's contracted timeliness and availability targets. 

Under the London Bus Franchise Model, making Bus Drivers pay for TfL's and Bus Operators' lethal contract priorities is called "efficiency". And any Mayor who claims to be contracting a public bus operation from for-profit Bus Companies more 'efficiently' for passengers who, at the time same, is not increasing fares or local taxes to fund this 'improvement', means that all this new efficiency is being funded by reductions to your pay and through degrading working conditions which have a direct impact on your safety performance.  

From my own experience underpinned by over a decade of research (all in the public domain), I know that the London Bus Franchise Model is both big business for Bus Operators and lethal for both Bus Workers and the general public. Since I began my research after recovering from critical injuries sustained in a Bus Crash in 2009, TfL's published data reveals that over 150 people have been killed and thousands have been seriously injured from preventable Bus Safety Incidents, the vast majority of these casualties generated from collisions. Since the current Mayor was elected in May 2016, at least 77 people have been killed from preventable Bus Safety Incidents, over three quarters of which were from collisions.

A recently issued cross-party London Assembly Transport Committee Investigation—its third since 2017—continued to highlight the same problems with the London Bus Franchise Model evidenced in the Assembly's previous investigations, i.e, Driver Fatigue, Lack of Toilet Dignity,  and Pressure to meet TfL's contracted timeliness and availability targets. Despite the London Mayor's announcement of 3 'world leading' Bus Safety Programmes and a Vision Zero Programme since 2016, the number of people killed and injured in Bus Safety Incidents in London is higher today than when the first of these Safety Programmes was announced on 1 February 2016.  Seeing that London's total Bus Fleet Size, Bus Mileage, and the actual number of both Bus Users and Bus Drivers have all shrunk since 2016, London Buses' negative safety trend is especially alarming. By all metrics of systemic safety, the London Bus Franchise Model is a manifest failure.   

Since I'm limited for time, please allow me to detail only a few of these systemic failures:

• Bus Collisions: despite the fact that London has fewer Buses, Bus Drivers and fewer Bus Miles run, Bus Collisions are now higher today than they were than when the present Mayor was elected in 2016. In 2023, TfL recorded over 70 Bus Crashes per day. TfL's annual tally for Bus Crashes now exceeds the number of London Bus Drivers: that's more than 1 recorded crash per London bus driver per year.  Since 2018, when London's Bus System Performance has been compared to its global 'world city peers', the city regularly appears in the quartile having the highest bus "collisions per km". I would wager London is the only European city to occupy this dubious place in the international benchmarking tables year-after-year.  

• Preventable Bus Safety Incident Injuries: Total Injuries generated from Preventable Bus Safety Incidents—the vast majority from collisions, but increasing numbers of passenger trips and falls onboard—are now higher than they were than when the present Mayor was elected.  Since 2016, an average of 3 people a day are sent to hospital from Preventable Bus Safety Incidents and, about every 6 weeks, someone has been sent to the morgue.  Remember: London has fewer Buses, Bus Drivers and fewer Bus Miles run than when the present Mayor was elected, so every bus, every bus mile, and every public bus journey is now more dangerous today than it was when the current "Vision Zero" Mayor was elected. 

• Bus Collision Investigations: in sharp contrast to the Rail, Air, and Maritime Sectors, Transport for London entrusts its Bus Contractors to carry out their own crash investigations. In fact, the Mayor has rejected all recommendations by London Assembly Members to establish an  Independent Bus Crash Investigation Branch for London.  The peculiar fact that TfL allows its Bus Contractors to investigate their own crashes was recently raised in the House of Lords by Lord Hampton. I hope that this scrutiny by Lord Hampton is a leading indicator that Westminster might take a greater interest in the known safety failings of the London Bus Franchise Model. 

• Bus Driver Fatigue: even though there is plenty of published evidence proving Bus Driver fatigue is chronic problem throughout the London Bus Operation and the Mayor has full authority to act to take meaningful and immediate action to mitigate it, the Mayor has refused to compel TfL to redesign London Bus Contracts to ensure that Bus Operators aren't financially-incentivised to enforce Fatigue-Inducing Rosters, Rotas and Working Practices. 

In fact, it is quite telling that, despite (a) the Mayor's announcements of 3 'world leading' Bus Safety Programmes, Vision Zero and (b) TfL incurring the largest Health and Safety Fine ever for Surface Transport Safety failings in July 2023, TfL's Framework Bus Contract has not changed since it was last updated in January 2016. 

The 2017 Loughborough Bus Driver Fatigue Report found that "stress and mental overload whilst driving" and "time pressure" from, inter alia, "headway" contributed to a working environment where 1 in 5 of the London Bus Drivers surveyed by Loughborough indicated that they had to fight sleepiness at least 2-3 times a week, and about 1 in 4 had a 'close call' due to fatigue in the past 12 months.

• Yet, in response to a question about the relationship between "Rest Day Working and Bus Safety Incidents" from London Assembly Member Neil Garratt in February 2023, the Mayor confirmed:

"The type of shift being worked at the time of an incident is not information that is routinely captured as part of the bus operator's initial incident reporting to Transport for London (TfL)." 

• In a response to a question about TfL's 'Bus Fatigue Management Working Group' from London Assembly Member Keith Prince in October 2023, the Mayor confirmed that this group meets in secret, has no published minutes or agendas and does not include any representatives of bus drivers or the public. 

• University College London's March 2021 Phase 2 Consulting Report about London Bus Driver Deaths from Covid-19 concluded and recommended—"Fatigue is a pre-existing issue for some bus drivers, with some evidence that COVID-19 infection and lockdown has contributed to this. Action, already being taken following previous research into factors contributing to tiredness, should be enhanced to address any new issues arising from the pandemic, following a short-term review of shift lengths, patterns and rotas"—Yet, despite repeated questioning from Keith Prince AM since 2021, the Mayor recently confirmed that TfL has yet failed to conduct a ""short term review of shift lengths, patterns and rotas" over three years after this recommendation was made. 

If "True ignorance is not the absence of knowledge, but the refusal to acquire it" then the Mayor's and TfL's apparent witting ignorance about the causes and effects of Fatigue among London Bus Drivers is, in my honest opinion, grossly negligent. 

• Lack of Toilet Dignity: TfL is responsible for ensuring that its contracted Bus Drivers have access to toilets while working and we know that 1 in 4 London Bus Routes lack Bus Driver Toilets at one end. The Mayor says that this lack of Toilet Dignity has been agreed with London Bus Workers only-recognised union, Unite, but neither the Mayor nor Unite will provide a copy of that agreed criteria. The Mayor recently revealed that this 'longstanding' criteria has never been subjected to a 'human factors' risk assessment.  

• Hot Cabs: even though he has full powers to act, the Mayor refuses to ensure that TfL Bus Contractors' will not force London Bus drivers "to drive - and will also suffer no consequences from their employer for refusing to drive - any London bus with a cab temperature that exceeds that for safe transport of livestock in the UK."  Last summer, Bus Drivers were regularly recording 40c in their cabs yet the Mayor refuses to inform the public what happened to the Bus Driver that newspapers reported had passed out in the bus cab from the heat and subsequently crashed. 

• Lack of Corporate Governance on Safety (1): the Mayor refuses to invite representatives of the public and Bus Workers to attend the Safety Bus Meetings TfL convenes every quarter with its Bus Contractors. If Bus Drivers aren't in the room where TfL decides safety policy with its contractors, then London Bus Safety Policy's happening without them. If Labour's going to give all local authorities the right to franchise Bus Services, Bus Workers need to be in the room where safety policies are negotiated, agreed, implemented and monitored. In London's Bus Franchise Model, the Mayor ensures they aren't.

• Lack of Corporate Governance on Safety (2): despite TfL being responsible for 100% of their revenue, the Mayor refuses to mandate that each Bus Contractor that supplies Bus Services to TfL appoint a Bus Worker Representative to the board.  If Labour's going to give all local authorities the right to franchise Bus Services, Bus Workers need to be in the board rooms where those contracts are negotiated, agreed, implemented and monitored.  Again, in London's Bus Franchise Model, the Mayor ensures they aren't. 

• Covid-19: 4 Years Ago last month, we had just entered a National Covid Lockdown. You probably don't need to be reminded that London Bus Drivers had the highest Covid-19 death rate of any class of UK workers. What you probably don't know is that TfL ordered the distribution of PPE to its own staff drivers on 9 April 2020 while, on the same day, it told Unite Bus Drivers' representatives that "masks are not needed". Two-Thirds of the London Bus Workers that TfL records as having died from from the virus did so in the two years after lockdown. Might the Mayor's failure to order TfL's Bus Operators to provide PPE for London Bus Workers when TfL was providing it for its own staff drivers help to explain why they continued to die from Covid-19 in 2021 and 2022? 

• Failure to Conduct Covid-19 Risk Assessments: In December 2021, the Mayor confirmed "Transport for London (TfL) does not require the bus operating companies to share copies of their risk assessments covering activities within their garage environments. This includes any that were created or updated as a result of Covid-19."  The Mayor admits that TfL chooses to be wittingly ignorant about its Bus Contractors' Safety Practices? In my view, that Mayor's response captures the essence of the manifest safety failure of the London Bus Franchise Model in a nutshell. 

Making "Better Buses" Better for Bus Workers and Public Safety

Taking advantage of the Freedom of Information rights we all have in the UK, I have voluntarily generated a vast amount of detailed evidence about the safety failings of the London Bus Franchise Model which is all available in the public record, i.e.,—

• Dozens of FOI Requests
• Hours of recorded public testimony by London Bus Drivers, Politicians and Experts
• Hundreds of Mayors's Questions
• Thousands of Pages of Evidence
• Hundreds of Thousands of Bus Safety Data Points

All this data evidences how lethal the London Bus Franchise Model has been for Bus Drivers and the public, especially pedestrians young and old, male and female.  Perhaps the Labour Party will be gratified to know that the London Bus Franchise Model is an 'equal opportunity killer'? 

With the near certainty of a crushing Labour Party victory in the impending National Election and that Party's promise to devolve bus contracting to local authorities, I can assure you that—warts and all—the London Bus Franchise Model will be coming to a local authority near you. 

If TfL's quarter-century experience contracting out Bus Services to Bus Contractors is any guide, when Labour does roll out the London Bus Franchise Model nationwide, then RMT Bus Workers should be prepared to combat—

• Contracted Punctuality, Availability and Convenience Targets taking priority over Bus Safety Performance
• Excluding Bus Workers from Decision-making about Bus System Safety 
• Excluding Bus Workers from Decision-making about Bus System Contract Priorities 
• Lower Wages and Longer Hours
• Shorter Rest Breaks
• Lack of Toilet Dignity
• Dangerously Hot Bus Cabs 
• Absence of Transparent Decision-making about Safety Policies that affect directly affect Bus Driver Working Conditions
• Lack of Transparency about Bus Contract Incentives, Bus Safety Performance and Local Government relationships with Bus Contractors
• Pressure to meet contracted bus timetables that prioritise passenger convenience over operational safety
• Public Authorities failing to collect key Bus Safety Performance Data
• Public Authorities hiding Bus Safety Performance Data from public scrutiny
• And lots more people killed and seriously injured from preventable Bus Safety Incidents

When I started looking for London's Public Bus Safety Performance Data from my hospital bed in February 2010, there was absolutely none to found anywhere in the public domain. Today, London is probably globally unique for the sheer volume of Bus Safety Data Performance Data TfL publishes: that transparency is entirely due to my voluntary campaign and the support my relentless efforts have received in London from (a) Conservative, Liberal Democrat and Green Assembly Members, (b) scores of Bus Drivers and (c) the Battersea and Wandsworth TUC  and, nationally, from the RMT and GMB unions.  You'll note that I've not mentioned either the Labour Party nor its largest funder Unite the Union in my 'shout-out' because, aside from some thoughtful outreach from Labour MP Matt Western 5 years ago, I've not heard anything from either in the 14 years I've been researching Bus Safety Performance in London.  

Lee Odams, RMT Vice Secretary Nottinghamshire & Derbyshire Bus Branch and Secretary of RMT National Industrial Organising Conference of Bus Workers discovered the value of having publicly-available data ready-to-hand when Manchester announced it was 'taking back control' of its Bus Network last year. Shortly after the October 2023 announcement, 2 pedestrians were killed in Bus Collisions about which Transport for Greater Manchester (TfGM)'s Director of Bus Stephen Rhodes had this to say: 

"We are concerned by the unusually high number of incidents involving buses over recent days, which is far above what we might normally see on any given week".  

But Lee knew that statement didn't ring true because in 2019 he sent Freedom of Information Requests to every council in the United Kingdom asking each to provide him with exactly the same Bus Safety Performance Data that TfL has published every quarter since 2014. And just like 90% of UK Councils that sent Lee a response, TfGM didn't have any Bus Safety Incident Data. And because Lee had a signed May 2019 letter from TfGM in hand stating explicitly—"...bus services in Greater Manchester are run by commercial services and they do not share this information with TfGM"— Lee was able to send Mayor Andy Burnham a copy of this evidence in an open letter asking if the Mayor of Manchester would compel TfGM commit to the publishing the same Bus Safety Data TfL publishes.   

In December 2023, Lee received a response to his open letter where TfGM indeed committed to publishing Manchester's Bus Safety Performance Data "in the future", but until we see anything in print, these are still only fine words. To be honest, I'm not reassured that TfGM decided that publishing Bus Timeliness Data took priority over its being transparent about its buses' operational safety performance, but it would appear that, just as in London, bus punctuality is the only metric Bus Passengers care about.   I wonder if any Bus Workers (or their unions) were in the room when TfGM's new contracted Bus Punctuality metrics were decided? 

I am pleased that this Conference has a Resolution encouraging Mayor Andy Burnham to force TfGM to keep its promise to make Manchester's Bus Safety Performance Data public. However, without (a) London being forced to publish Bus Safety Performance data after years of voluntary campaigning by me and (b) Lee Odams embarrassing Mayor Burnham and TfGM publicly by publishing its 2019 FOI response to him, I'd wager neither of the UK's two leading cities where the Mayors oversee Bus Contracts would have done anything.  Manchester still hasn't.

Meanwhile, Labour has promised to put forward a 'Better Buses Bill' as soon as it gets into power. We will need a lot of "Lee Odamses" in many local and regional authorities throughout the UK to ensure that all the new authorities contracting bus services will, at a minimum, be as transparent about Bus Safety Performance as London and—at some point in the future—Manchester.  Will Labour's 'Better Buses Bill' compel Regional Mayors and Local Authorities who contract public Bus Services through franchises collect and publish their contracted Bus Operations' Safety Performance Data for public scrutiny on a regular basis? 

Now that the London Bus Franchise Model is no longer a question of "if" but "when" it will be implemented by a local authority near you, it is imperative that the RMT Union fully appreciates how its adoption by Regional and Local Political Leaders vested with the same executive authority enjoyed by London's Mayor will impact upon its members' working conditions, wages, general well-being and public safety.  It's useful to note that the English words for "politics" and "policies" share the same root.  And since we live in a democracy and have Freedom of Information rights, as RMT members and Bus Drivers Paul McDonnell, Lee Odams, Theresa Emerson, Lorraine Robertson, and Kevin Mustafa have known for years, there's no reason why RMT Bus Workers need to wait to receive permission from anyone before launching 'independent inquiries' of their own. So that Labour's "Better Buses" politics stands a chance of producing Bus Franchise polices that are actually better for Bus Workers and public safety,  labour unions urgently need to launch more of those Independent Inquiries. And I'll be pleased to assist them if they do. 

Thank you for your time.

Tom Kearney

#LondonBusWatch

E: comadad1812@gmail.com

Twitter: @comadad

via Email and Blog Post

• "Mr Moss says he spoke to one inspector who said it was because the bus drivers are under pressure to make up time on the route, so they skip stops."
• "The ticket inspector said the schedule is too tight," he says."
• "And the drivers have been told, 'if you're late , if you don't have time', and these were the inspector's words, 'then just go go go'."

"The problem that we have with speed limits as a bus driver is that we drive to a timetable, what is called a headway. Now that we are coming across roads that have the 20mph speed limit, our timetables have not been changed to take into consideration that we are going 10mph less, doing 20mph as opposed to 30mph. That is a problem that we are having."

"We are concerned by the unusually high number of incidents involving buses over recent days, which is far above what we might normally see on any given week".  

"Since 2014, Transport for London (TfL) has published Bus Safety Incident Data on its website every quarter (https://tfl.gov.uk/corporate/publications-and- reports/bus-safety-data). The data publishes shows injuries by Bus Route, Operator and Borough supported by a dataset containing all this information made available for public scrutiny. Accordingly, I would like to make a Freedom of Information Request for Transport for Greater Manchester to provide me with a spreadsheet displaying the Bus Safety Incident Data for the period 1 January -30 March 2019 showing: 

1.     Date of Incident 2.     Bus Route3.     Local Name of Operator

4.     Operator Group Name (if applicable)

5.     Bus Garage/Depot

6.     Injury Description (Fatality, Serious/Minor Injury - Taken to Hospital, MinorTreated at Scene)7.     Victim's Sex

8.     Victim's Age

9.     Incident Event Type (Collision, Fall, Assault, other)

10.  Victim Category (Passenger, Pedestrian, Cyclists, 3rd Party Vehicle, Bus Driver, other)" 

"We do not hold any recorded information in relation to your request.  Since bus deregulation in 1986, bus services in Greater Manchester are run by commercial services and they do not share this information with TfGM.  Bus services in London were never affected by deregulation. TfL runs a franchising system which allows them to collate and publish this data." 

At a meeting of the London Assembly Transport Committee on 27 September 2023, Keith Prince AM asked TfL to 'come clean' about what decisions it took about a Safety Audit that TfL was finalising at the time Sandilands occurred to be (a) cancelled (b) kept from the RAIB Investigation and (c) removed from the public record.  

Here is my annotated informal transcript of Keith Prince's statement (a formal record of which will no doubt be published on the London Assembly site in due course)—

"From evidence TfL has provided through numerous Mayor's Questions and FOIs, when the Sandilands Tragedy occurred on 9 November 2019, these facts are known—

• TfL was putting the final touches on Internal Audit 16767 ("Trams Management of Operational Risk") which had already concluded First Group "Adequately Controlled" Operational Risk on the Croydon Tram." 

• "Hours after the crash, one of the Auditors sent an email to the Head of Audit which stated 
• "As soon as I heard the news this morning my thoughts were, my audit is going to be more high profile"  
• "Incidentally, the Derailment RA [Risk Assessment] was last reviewed on November 2013, so is one overdue for review"

• "Despite being asked for this Audit twice by the RAIB Investigators (on 24 November 2016 and 24 January 2017), Internal Audit 16767 was never provided by TfL to the RAIB and IA 16767 is nowhere to be found in TfL's Audit and Assurance Committee Records." 

• "Despite being—on 9 November 2016 and in the words of TfL's auditor— "more high profile", TfL appears to have deleted IA 16767 from the public record" .

1) Publish the Contents of the Blacked-Out Letter that TfL released in its much-delayed response to Question 2019/17340?

2) Publish a link to the evidence TfL made available in its response to Question 2019/17340 on the GLA Mayor's Question Time Site? I know for a fact that this evidence has been published online by a concerned member of the public — why not publish the Question 2019/17340 evidence on the GLA site and stop giving the impression TfL's trying to hide something?"

"I am determined to lead the most transparent, engaged & accessible administration London has ever seen"

—Sadiq Khan, Mayor of London, 7 May 2016

"Transport for London leads the way on bus safety" exclaimed the headline of an Opinion piece penned by Tom Cunnington, TfL's Director of Bus Business Development that recently appeared in the news site and publication Route One ("Number One for Coach, Bus & Minibus"). While Tom Cunnington's PR placement highlighted all of TfL's good intentions surrounding its two decades-long 'roll-out' of Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) to its contracted Bus Fleet, when you think about, the TfL executive merely parrots the words TfL has been using for many years while conveniently forgetting that New York City did lots of the same stuff TfL claim as "a first" twenty-odd years ago. 

But let's not get bogged down in the details, there's plenty of time for that!

Though, before we start, let me introduce myself: I've had over thirty years experience in the bus industry, top-to-bottom, and while I will try not to befuddle you with tech and bus lingo, ask virtually any Bus Driver the same questions and—with only a few months in the industry—he or she will give you the same sort of feedback, if not with the same level of detail.

If there is anything that needs clarifying I will endeavour to help out, but I'll also try to keep this as simple as I possibly can. 

So without further ado, let's get going.

Let's look at Tom Cunnington's published remarks:

"We welcome the work on improving bus safety by Stagecoach East on the Cambridgeshire Guided Busway, but its use of the retarder with Intelligent Speed Assistance (ISA) in the UK is not a "first"."

Sounds impressive doesn't it? But how do you think this system works?

"Bus Safety" is the buzzword here—you'd imagine that using this would mean that buses were "safer" because "every journey matters"—but how exactly have buses been made "safer"? 

Because I do hope Tom Cunnington will explain how...

"Transport for London's Bus Safety Development team has been working with London Bus Operators, manufacturers, and suppliers like Actia for several years, and led the way with trials of the technology on urban buses."

Again, lots of big words designed to make you think that Safety's a huge priority! An entire team dedicated to bus safety development, working with operators, manufacturers and suppliers...for several years even!

Let's conveniently disregard the recent London Assembly discussion about the long-standing problem of Lack of Air Conditioning (A/C) in Bus Drivers' cabs—and how TfL will need to commission a complete redesign of the bus to make A/C work. Bus Drivers working in unsafe hot conditions in Bus Cabs has been an an issue since at least 2006 when TfL mandated that all buses must have Bus Cab A/C fitted to its contractors' vehicles.  Today A/C is fitted, it just doesn't work in most cases because TfL didn't insert the word 'working' next to 'installed' in its requirement!  We'll leave the long sad story of Bus Cab A/C for another thread, but please keep this in mind: the difference between TfL announcing that some new 'safety' technology will be 'installed' but not insisting—contractually—that the technology is actually 'working' suggests that TfL's ability to monitor implementation of 'safer' technologies like ISA (and A/C!) is compromised from the start. I do wonder if that systemic fault is intentional? 

But I digress...let's get back to the to the blog!

How many Bus Operators was Tom Cunnington talking about? Where do TfL and they have these "discussions"? Behind closed doors would be a good guess and certainly appears to be true.   

But when you realise that the ISA trials were done by Volvo on their buses, it doesn't sound as impressive does it?

"ISA formed part of our 2019 Bus Safety Standard, and has been mandatory on all new buses in London since then. Through a combination of retrofit and new, Stagecoach in London has over 500 buses fitted with Actia systems that limit the bus' speed through the retarder, with a further 1800 at the other London operators."

OK.  Let's assume the Mayor is correct and that a total of 3280 buses in TfL's total fleet (about 36% of the total) do have ISA fitted by now.  Let me tell you this fact though: this may reflect the situation on paper, but the reality is far from that.

Let's first take this "2019 Bus Safety Standard" (that, in fact, TfL announced in October 2018): one of the things it includes is a pedal camera in the Driver's footwell, because there were too many instances of 'pedal confusion'—again, on paper—that led to many crashes, some of them fatal. Nothing to do with runaway buses where there was a fault, oh no, the "blame the Driver for everything" mantra is strong here. 

Let's also look at that repeated word "retarder". The retarder is the electromagnet that's in the "gearbox" to help slow the bus down when the brakes are applied, to give a smoother braking feel to the passengers rather than to rely solely on the foundation brakes where you have the brakes working on their own. When the retarder fails, you can't use the bus as it takes so much more stopping that you can literally put your foot through the floor and it still doesn't stop. So the use of the word retarder here is not just incorrect, it's for something altogether completely different.

The actual method of the ISA is explained in his next paragraph, which, again, sounds great, but we'll take a closer look at it.

"This system uses a digital speed map which can be regularly updated as speed limits are changed, and because it does not rely on mapping the individual routes, it also works when the buses change garages, run out of service, and even on rail replacement."

The system TfL describes sounds wonderful, but dig a little deeper and it soon starts to fall apart.

• The digital speed map is designed by the Bus Operator.
• It is updated by the Bus Operator.
• The limits are changed by the Bus Operator.

You guessed it! the Bus Operator.

You may be asking "But why would TfL fit such a system and then not use it as it is designed to be used?"

And here is the rub that neither Tom Cunnington nor TfL will be rushing to write to Route One about.

TfL pay to have the ISA system fitted and then let the Bus Operator run it. And as the recent Sandilands tram investigation showed us, this kind of "hands-off" contractual arrangement is—quite literally—'an accident waiting to happen'.

Imagine—if you will—the very basics of how TfL operates: TfL pay a Bus Operator a set sum of money to operate a bus service—based on contract targets such as service intervals, i.e., how often a bus is going to turn up.  These contracted time targets have historically meant that the same numbers of buses will run at the same frequency. 

But we already know that buses are running around faster than they should because the Drivers are late (or they need to use the facilities, or there are too many passengers, or someone has parked in a bus lane, or it's raining, or there's a Y in the day etc....).  So when 20mph speed limits are imposed across the board, the bus time tables don't change and the Drivers are expected to make those same bus journeys at the same frequency and—get this—at the same speed.  And if there is an accident—"e.g, the Driver was driving too fast to meet the contracted timetable, we have held a meeting and he's been sacked, that's the end of that" (assuming you ever find out this is what's happened because, as we all know, these meetings are held behind closed doors and not independently reviewed or scrutinised, so anything could happen and it all gets brushed under the carpet and the public knows nothing).

Now imagine TfL's limited the buses' speed, and—all of a sudden—those contracted buses can't get to where they need to go in time and the Bus Drivers can't make any of that time up by speeding because ISA means they can't:  TfL will have to add more buses to the system—which costs money. So it would appear that TfL are more than happy to turn a blind eye to the ISA systems not being switched on by the Bus Operators: it's a win-win...except for Safety, of course.

And because there is no one there from TfL to monitor if the technology is actually 'working', TfL does nothing when Bus Operators disable ISA—so their Bus Drivers can speed to meet TfL's contracted Timeliness and Availability targets.

Officially though, TfL have now incorporated speed checking into the ticket machine since TfL went "module-less" a few years ago, so much so that TfL has the capacity to identify every single Bus that's broken the speed limit—by Operator, by Depot, by Route, by Bus and even by the Driver. Moreover, TfL now sells access to this Speed Data to the Bus Operators, with the knowledge that the Bus Operators are required to show at least 3 months of continuous late running before TfL will consider altering any contract's route timings. And despite seeing all that evidence of unsafe speeding by Bus Drivers who are incentivised by TfL to meet the route timings embedded in these contracts, TfL may still decide it doesn't want to adjust those contracted route timings to reflect reality/improve safety. 

So you got this, right? 

• The Bus Driver speeds to make up time and keep to the Bus Operators' contracted Timeliness and Availability targets;  
• Despite the obvious disconnect between the contracted targets and the reality of driving conditions the route, TfL doesn't change the route timing;
• if the Driver has an accident, the Bus Operator disciplines the Driver for speeding;
• Bus accidents 'happen', people are killed and seriously-injured, Bus Drivers are disciplined (or fired).....and nothing changes.

"We have also introduced ISA that stops the bus from accelerating beyond the speed limit on 1150 Euro VI Volvo hybrid buses, using the less agile route-based mapping and geofencing for each route the buses will travel on - as described by Paul Halford."

Remember a little way back when TfL were citing the Bus Safety Standard it introduced in October 2018?

Well, even before that, there's a set limit to how fast buses can accelerate from a standing start, and it's been getting lower and lower over the years.

This is fine from a passenger safety point of view—no one wants granny to fall over and break her hip—but it's not at all helpful when you are crawling along in traffic, pulling out at a roundabout, pulling away from the lights—ie., all the things a Bus Driver needs to do during the course of a normal working day behind the wheel. 

And from a Bus Driver's perspective, it's a stress-inducing madness—

• you lose more time than you would (time that you can't afford to lose because you'll be dropping back later and later)
• the newer bus in front of you, which is even slower (but 'safer'), is also running late, and backing up the route—
• and then the iBus Controller is on every Bus Driver's case complaining to each how they're ruining the service.

Can you see how the "real life" experience of a London Bus Driver is so far removed from the computer-generated perfect world of sound bites and "look at how great we are!" propaganda proffered to the public from TfL's  'higher-uppers' like Tom Cunnington?

That's before you discover that Volvo set up the ISA system in, I think, 2016 and it took years for that tech to be incorporated into the other types of buses.

I could complicate things by explaining how wide a variety of vehicles are deployed by Contractors on the London Bus Fleet. I could confuse you even further by explaining how the mechanicals of the bus can be made by one manufacturer and the body by another—this is why there was no standard Covid Screen 'protection' that TfL claimed was fitted: some companies used sellotape, while others used shower screens!  Here again, the difference between 'installed' and 'working' probably made a huge difference to human lives and livelihoods.

As you can see, there's a 'reality gap' that separates Mr. Cunnington's few simple 'pats-on-the-back' paragraphs from what ISA really means for London's Bus Drivers and the public. 

I could have expanded this Guest Blog to tens times the length, so, please bear with me while I continue to expose how far out of touch TfL and its Bus Operators remain with those of us here working on the coal face every day.

Stay safe.  See you soon!

—Bus Driver V0

From: Members Correspondence <MembersCorrespondence@tfl.gov.uk>

Good afternoon

I'm writing to let you know that the sentencing hearing of TfL and Tram Operations Limited (TOL) by the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) concluded today in connection with the 2016 Sandilands tragedy. The ORR prosecuted TfL and TOL for an offence under the Health and Safety at Work, etc Act 1974. TfL and TOL pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity. TfL and TOL were ordered to pay fines. 

TfL Commissioner, Andy Lord, Lilli Matson, Chief Safety Health and Environment Officer, Glynn Barton, Chief Operating Officer and Mark Davis, General Manager for London Trams were present throughout the three day hearing and were deeply moved and saddened hearing the devastating impact of the tragedy on those who were injured and the families of those who lost their lives. 

On behalf of TfL we apologise for this tragedy and for the pain, distress and suffering that all those affected have endured and continue to endure. None of us can begin to appreciate the enormity of the loss suffered by the families and friends of Dane Chinnery, Donald Collett, Robert Huxley, Philip Logan, Dorota Rynkiewicz, Philip Seary and Mark Smith or the impact on the lives of the many who suffered injury. Every passenger on the tram that morning entrusted their safety to us but we failed them and for that we are truly sorry. We remain committed to providing support to anyone who needs it.

We accepted responsibility promptly and we did everything possible to ensure the right support was quickly in place to help all those affected. Since 2016, we have delivered an extensive programme of major industry-leading safety improvements to the tram network. We have worked closely with the independent Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) and the ORR to introduce a new safety regime and implement all measures that were applicable to our tram network. Alongside TOL, we have been at the forefront of implementing innovative technology on the Croydon tram network to address the RAIB's recommendations and to improve safety for customers and staff. This includes implementing speed restrictions, additional signage for drivers, measures to improve visibility, measures to combat driver fatigue and distraction, an automated braking system, and improved emergency evacuation procedures and risk assessments.  

We continually review our network and work with the wider tram industry to ensure we are running the safest possible service for our customers - and to ensure that such a tragedy can never happen again. 

Kind regards

Kirsten

Kirsten

Government Relations

Transport for London